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I.  DOCTRINAL OPENNESS AND FUNCTIONAL PRIVATIZATION 
The topic of this symposium, Secrecy, suggests a focus on 
affirmative decisions shutting out the public by sealing records and 
closing courtrooms. My interest, in contrast, is in a broader set of 
processes that makes dispute resolution inaccessible and, in that 
sense, secret. My focus is on the problem of institutional privatization, 
as contrasted with questions of individuals’ personal privacy. The 
kind of secrecy I discuss here has several sources including the 
promotion of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) through in-
chambers judicial management and settlement efforts; the design of 
some online dispute resolution (“ODR”) and court-annexed 
arbitration programs; mandates to outsource dispute resolution to 
private providers; bans on pursuing relief through class actions; and 
the costs to individuals of pursuing claims.1  
Rather than any “natural” states of open or closed dispute 
resolution, political and social movements shape laws endowing 
courts, ADR, ODR, and arbitration with their attributes. Today, we 
assume courts to be open and think of judicial management and of 
arbitration as closed. These assumptions are the product of rules, 
doctrine, and practices that are in motion. As I detail below, much of 
what takes place in courts increasingly happens outside the public 
purview, and yet some judges do pre-trial work in open court, on the 
bench and on the record.2 Likewise, while privately provided 
 
 1. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the 
Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2807–09 (2015) 
[hereinafter Resnik, Diffusing Disputes]; Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in 
Courts: Changing the Experiences and Logics of the Public’s Role in Court-Based ADR, 15 
NEV. L.J. 1631, 1636–37 (2015) [hereinafter Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in 
Courts]. 
 2. See Steven G. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, 61 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 849, 861–62 (2013). The Honorable Judge David Campbell of the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Arizona, described doing pretrial conferences on the record and 
typically on the bench. See Judge David Campbell, Chairman, Advisory Comm. on the 
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arbitrations are generally cloistered, some jurisdictions permit public 
access to court-annexed arbitration.3 
A distinction therefore needs to be drawn between what I call 
the doctrinal openness of courts, familiar because of layers of custom, 
practice, rules, and law formally committed to public access, and the 
functional privatization of court-based activities and of some forms of 
arbitration that make interactions and outcomes inaccessible. The 
entrenchment of new rules of privatization reflect what Marc 
Galanter described as the ability of “repeat players” (the “haves” in 
his classic article) to come out “ahead” by using their resources and 
knowledge to structure procedures benefitting their interests rather 
than those of “one-shot” players.4 Even as game metaphors give me 
pause given the impact that law has on our lives, Galanter’s analysis 
locates how reiterative involvement provides insights into, and the 
potential for authority over, the procedures that have substantive 
impacts on rights and remedies. 
Repeat players (such as governments, businesses, and lawyers 
regularly in court) have by definition a visibility that one-shot players 
lack. It may, therefore, be surprising to learn that federal and state 
courts are filled with one-shot participants, appearing without lawyers 
to represent them. Between 2005 and 2016, unrepresented litigants 
filed about a quarter or more of the civil claims filed in federal 
courts.5 More than half of appeals in federal courts are pursued by 
 
Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, Address at the Univ. of Ariz. James E. Rodgers Coll. of 
Law Civil Procedure Workshop (Oct. 5, 2017). 
 3. Illinois is one example; its thousands of court-annexed arbitrations take place in 
courts or arbitration centers open to the public. See infra notes 19, 155–58, and 
accompanying text. 
 4. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 98–103 (1974); Joel B. Grossman, Herbert M. 
Kritzer & Stewart Macaulay, Do the “Haves” Still Come Out Ahead?, 33 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 803 (1999). Galanter’s analysis focused on courts and did not compare the impact of 
repeat playing and resources in obtaining or structuring the rules for other services, such 
as health care. See Richard Lempert, A Classic at 25: Reflections of Galanter’s “Haves” 
Article and Work It Has Inspired, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1099, 1108 (1999). 
 5. The term used in the federal data collection is pro se. See U.S. COURTS, CIVIL 
PRO SE AND NON-PRO SE FILINGS, BY DISTRICT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD 
ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2016 [hereinafter 2016 U.S. DISTRICT COURT PRO SE FILINGS], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_c13_0930.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc
/9AAL-EGHM]. The federal court database details all pro se filings since 2005. See U.S. 
COURTS, CIVIL PRO SE AND NON-PRO SE FILINGS (2005–2010) [hereinafter 2005–2010 
U.S. DISTRICT COURT PRO SE FILINGS], http://www.uscourts.gov/report-names/judicial-
business?tn=c-13&pt=All&t=All&m%5Bvalue%5D%5Bmonth%5D=&y%5Bvalue%5D
%5Byear%5D= [https://perma.cc/NES9-E9W3]. 
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individuals lacking lawyers.6 Studies of state courts identify higher 
percentages of lawyer-less litigants. The National Center for State 
Courts (“NCSC”) sampled cases in ten major counties and, in about 
three quarters of some 650,000 cases analyzed, at least one side was 
not represented by an attorney.7 
Lawyers are the proverbial repeat players, and one way to bring 
lawyers into cases is through government funding for those who 
cannot afford them. Congress did so in 1974, when it created the 
Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”).8 But during the subsequent 
decades, Congress provided budget allocations insufficient to meet 
the demand for these legal services.9 In 2016, the LSC reported that 
individuals eligible for its services regularly “received inadequate or 
no legal help.”10 
Another major infusion of lawyering resources comes from class 
actions. Aggregation responds to the problem that some claims have 
what economists call “negative value,” meaning that the expenses of 
recovery are larger than the direct loss incurred. As Benjamin Kaplan, 
the principal drafter of the 1966 revision to the federal class action 
rule put it, group-based litigation enabled individuals, lacking 
“effective strength” individually to pursue their claims, to join 
together and seek redress.11 Repeat players also saw the value in 
 
 6. U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS—PRO SE CASES COMMENCED AND 
TERMINATED, BY CIRCUIT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING, DURING THE 12-MONTH 
PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2016 [hereinafter U.S. APPELLATE COURT PRO SE 
FILINGS], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b9_0930.2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V4T3-DBMA]. 
 7. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
STATE COURTS 31–32 (2015) [hereinafter LANDSCAPE CIVIL LITIGATION STATE 
COURTS 2015], https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Research/CivilJusticeReport-
2015.ashx [https://perma.cc/4RSJ-MDUW]. 
 8. History, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., https://www.lsc.gov/about-lsc/who-we-are/history 
[https://perma.cc/U4G5-R4EG]. 
 9. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., REPORT OF THE PRO BONO TASK FORCE 1–2 (2012), 
https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/attach/2015/09/Report-ProBonoTaskForce-2012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XZ4G-2HNT]. As the LSC reported, “at least 50% of people seeking 
help from LSC-funded organizations—and eligible to receive it—are turned away because 
of insufficient resources.” Id. 
 10. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL 
LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 6 (2017), https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default
/files/images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3FZ-KUHK]. 
 11. Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 
(1969). I provide some of the history of the drafting of the 1966 revisions to Rule 23 in 
Judith Resnik, Reorienting the Process Due: Using Jurisdiction to Forge Post-Settlement 
Relationships Among Litigants, Courts, and the Public in Class and Other Aggregate 
Litigation, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1017, 1019–31 (2017) [hereinafter Resnik, Reorienting the 
Process Due] and Judith Resnik, “Vital” State Interests: From Representative Actions for 
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aggregation because grouping claims together offered economies of 
scale and the possibility of obtaining closure about their liabilities.12 
But federal legislation and recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court have erected barriers to the use of collective actions. As of 
1996, LSC lawyers cannot bring class actions.13 As of 2011, federal 
and state courts must enforce class-action bans that manufacturers, 
employers, and service providers impose on their less well-resourced 
counterparts, consumers, and employees.14 These clauses (inserted in 
job applications and consumer product information) typically 
mandate that if disputes arise, claimants may not pursue their rights 
in courts but can only proceed, single-file, in dispute resolution 
systems designated by employers or manufacturers. Arbitration 
clauses sometimes also permit consumers and employees to use small 
claims courts, again without collective actions.15 
Resource asymmetries among classes of litigants are therefore 
central to discussions of how functional privatization has become so 
salient a feature of dispute resolution in the United States. 
Proponents of class action bans understand that group-based 
proceedings—whether in courts or in arbitration—are engines of 
publicity. The number of people involved undermines the capacity to 
keep private the allegations of misbehavior and the decisions reached 
about their legality.16 Moreover, as I detail below, the insertion of 
mandates to arbitrate in employee and consumer documents has not 
resulted in a mass of arbitrations. Rather, amidst tens of millions of 
consumers and employees, almost none file arbitration claims. And if 
 
Fair Labor Standards to Pooled Trusts, Class Actions, and MDLS in the Federal Courts, 
165 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1788–95 (2017) [hereinafter Resnik, “Vital” State Interests]. 
 12. Resnik, “Vital” State Interests, supra note 11, at 1778–80, 1788–96. 
 13. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-134, § 504(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321–53 (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1617.3 (2017)); 
see also Judith Resnik, Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond the Vanishing Trial: Unrepresented 
Claimants, De Facto Aggregations, Arbitration Mandates, and Privatized Processes, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1921–22 (2017) [hereinafter Resnik, Beyond the Vanishing Trial]. 
 14. I analyze the development of the law on such bans in Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, 
supra note 1, at 2863–74. See also MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE 
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 33–40, 130–35 (2013); Robin 
Bradley Kar & Margaret Jane Radin, Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning Analysis 66–
69 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 18-12, 2017). 
 15. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT § 1028(A), at 15–17 (2015) [hereinafter CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION 
STUDY], http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress
-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/32YD-S2JB]. 
 16. This suppression of claims is one factor in the flattening filings in both state and 
federal courts. See Resnik, Beyond the Vanishing Trial, supra note 13, at 1902–21. 
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they do, they are often subjected to confidentiality clauses directing 
them not to discuss either processes or outcomes. 
Repeat players have thus largely succeeded in persuading courts 
to approve confidentiality clauses even as judges acknowledge the 
advantages derived from one side knowing the track record of past 
proceedings, while individual opponents do not.17 The silencing of 
opponents, coupled with the relocation of dispute resolution to 
private providers that have no commitments to open access, has 
reoriented dispute resolution. The norms that undergird the various 
new rules diffuse and privatize process; in practice, the result is often 
cutting off the ability to bring claims in any forum.18 
In the title of this Article, I use “A2J,” because it (or “ATJ”) is 
the shorthand for state and federal task forces aiming to improve 
“access to justice.”19 These projects are largely focused on enabling 
 
 17. See, e.g., Guyden v. Aetna Inc., 544 F.3d 376, 384–85 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding 
enforceable arbitration mandates imposed by an employer despite recognizing that “in the 
context of individual statutory claims, a lack of public disclosure may systematically favor 
companies over individuals” (quoting Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1477 
(D.C. Cir. 1997))); Iberia Credit Bureau Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175 
(5th Cir. 2004) (“While the confidentiality requirement is probably more favorable to the 
cellular provider than to its customer, the plaintiffs have not persuaded us that the 
requirement is so offensive as to be invalid.”); Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs. VI, Inc., 
368 F.3d 269, 279–81 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding no unfairness in employee confidentiality 
clause because “[e]ach side has the same rights and restraints . . . and there is nothing 
inherent in confidentiality itself that favors or burdens one party . . . in the dispute 
resolution process”). 
 18. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 1, at 2852–54. Efforts to stop the use of 
collective actions in Europe are likewise underway through efforts of the Institute for 
Legal Reform (“ILR”), related to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, as illustrated by its 
monographs emphasizing the “risks” of collective redress. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR 
LEGAL REFORM, THE GROWTH OF COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN THE EU: A SURVEY OF 
DEVELOPMENTS IN 10 MEMBER STATES 1 (2017), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com
/uploads/sites/1/The_Growth_of_Collective_Redress_in_the_EU_A_Survey_of_Developments
_in_10_Member_States_April_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YMQ-WSZ3]. The Chamber 
calls for “safeguards.” U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SUPPORTING 
SAFEGUARDS: EU CONSUMER ATTITUDES TOWARDS COLLECTIVE ACTIONS AND 
LITIGATION FUNDING 1 (2017), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1
/EU_Paper_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6QY-EB4M]. 
 19. See Access to Justice Commissions, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org
/groups/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/initiatives/resource_center_for_access_to_justice/at
j-commissions.html [https://perma.cc/5UQ3-54L5]; Office for Access to Justice, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atj [https://perma.cc/7AH8-PQSG]. Several states 
have established access to justice commissions. See, e.g., STATUTORY COURT FEE TASK 
FORCE, ILLINOIS COURT ASSESSMENTS: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
ADDRESSING BARRIERS TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND ADDITIONAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED 
WITH FEES AND OTHER COURT COSTS IN CIVIL, CRIMINAL, AND TRAFFIC 
PROCEEDINGS 1 (2016), www.illinoiscourts.gov/2016_Statutory_Court_Fee_Task_Force
_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9GX-TS24] [hereinafter ILLINOIS COURT ASSESSMENTS 
2016]; CONN. JUDICIAL BRANCH ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 
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claimants to come to court or otherwise obtain assistance related to 
legal claims. These task forces have done essential work in clarifying 
the need for legal advice, in detailing the layers of court assessments 
that limit access, and in seeking to build coalitions among repeat and 
one-shot players. But these task forces have not often focused on how 
to shore up the public dimension of the disputing that is done in 
courts as well as in courts’ alternatives. 
I link “A2J” to “A2K”—“access to knowledge”—to underscore 
the interdependencies of the two. Not only does the act of rendering 
judgments require knowledge, but assessing the justice of those 
judgments also requires that third parties be able to understand 
particular cases, watch interactions, and know the systems in which 
individual judgments are made. Access-to-justice initiatives therefore 
need to become yet more ambitious by going beyond helping people 
find more “paths” to obtain redress and persuading legislatures to 
fund lawyers and courts to reduce the burdens on individuals.20 To 
turn access into justice, the agendas of A2J have to include generating 
practices and constitutional doctrine insistent on making dispute 
resolution processes and outcomes open to the public. 
Without public access, one cannot know whether fair treatment 
is accorded regardless of litigants’ status. Without public 
participation, no one can see how norms of equal treatment can be 
turned into dignified interactions among litigants and decision-
makers. Without oversight, one cannot ensure that judges are 
independent of parties. Without independent judges acting in public 
and treating disputants in an equal and dignified manner, outcomes 
lose their claim to legitimacy. And without public accountings of how 
legal norms are being applied, one cannot consider the need for 
revisions of underlying rules, remedies, and procedures by which to 
decide claims of right. We lose the very capacity to debate what our 
forms and norms of fairness are. 
Courts and arbitration are creatures of our own making, 
refashioned regularly through politics producing legal change. By 
toggling back and forth in this Article between court-based 
adjudication, arbitration, and other forms of ADR, I show the degree 
to which the processes interact, how practices, regulations, and 
constitutional doctrine shape—and reshape—the normative 
expectations of each, and why a retrieval of public processes, 
 
1 (2012), https://www.jud.ct.gov/committees/access/ATJ_AnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc
/KZV4-R28Z]; In re Okla. Access to Justice Comm’n, 2014 OK 16, __ P.3d __ (mem.). 
 20. See HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT 
GOING TO LAW 249–64 (1999). 
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consistent with protection of individuals’ privacy, is imperative for the 
body politic. 
A roadmap to what follows is in order. In Part II, I address a 
predicate question: why, in a world replete with information sources, 
does it matter if people can go to court and use dispute resolution 
processes accessible to the public? After exploring the normative 
values at stake, I reflect in Part III on why we understand ourselves to 
be entitled—as a matter of “right”—to have courts be public and 
open venues. I then turn to an array of practices in courts and 
arbitration that diminish the occasions on which the public has 
anything to watch. 
In Part IV, I discuss how the closing off of ADR and ODR 
interact with bans on class actions, confidentiality clauses, and a host 
of “legal financial obligations” (“LFOs”), all of which make dispute 
resolution inaccessible and aspects of it secret. Part IV also shows 
some of the impact. I add to the documentation on the use of 
arbitration by mining publicly available databases that reflect how 
unusual single-file consumer claims are. To the extent ODR creates 
new routes to redress, the versions practiced in the United States 
have not built in third-party access to welcome observers or to enable 
assessment of its processes or outcomes. The pressures on courts to 
finance their own services are another way in which access is limited; 
a host of assessments deter litigants from using courts. Filing suit also 
imposes costs on opponents. Defendants in both criminal and civil 
proceedings are often put at risk of incurring financial obligations that 
make those with resources complain of a need to capitulate, especially 
if faced with class action plaintiffs. For less well resourced defendants, 
lawsuits can put them into cycles of debt or pressure them into 
defaulting even when they have potential defenses to assert.21 
Part V turns to the need to reframe constitutional doctrine so as 
to constrain the functional privatization of dispute resolution. Current 
approaches rely on the tradition of access to trials as the benchmark. 
Given the rarity of trials, preserving public practices requires revising 
the legal inquiries to focus on the utilities of open dispute resolution 
as it now takes place, whether in person or through exchanges of 
materials online. 
I close in Part VI with the reminder that making courts accessible 
is in the interests of individual and repeat players. In the nineteenth 
 
 21. See Peter A. Holland, Junk Justice: A Statistical Analysis of 4,400 Lawsuits Filed 
by Debt Buyers, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 179, 208–14, 223–32 (2014); infra notes 261–
74. 
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century, creditors pressed for constitutional protection of open courts 
and rights to remedies to ease pursuit of debtors. In the twentieth 
century, banks saw collective actions as useful when marketing new 
economic products because aggregation enabled limiting repetitive 
disputes about the propriety of investment decisions.22 Governments 
likewise depend on courts to validate their authority and to enforce 
their norms. 
Reminders of the utilities of public court procedures in the 
twenty-first century come from “#MeToo”—an explosion of claims in 
the fall of 2017 in which individuals described their experiences of 
having been sexually harassed and of having been silenced out of fear 
of retribution or by virtue of settlements that mandated 
confidentiality.23 The reiterative cri de coeur is for accountability, 
which reflects how, in the past, the results of investigations into 
misbehavior have often been closed off. 
Evidence that these remarkable public declarations about sexual 
predatory behavior could show repeat players the importance of 
public processes is emerging. Members of Congress have proposed 
legislation to protect access to court-based remedies for employees 
alleging sexual harassment; the bill would exempt them from being 
routed exclusively to arbitration, with its connotations of closed 
proceedings.24 What the #MeToo movement has already exemplified 
is that a myriad of barriers make it difficult to bring claims against 
more powerful opponents and that, if claims are pursued, secrecy has 
often been part of the price of the resolution. The outpouring of 
stories shows that secrecy has its costs, both for third parties who 
might not have been in harm’s way and for those directly involved. 
#MeToo also exemplifies the ways in which the dissemination of 
information without the constraints of legal process makes it hard to 
sort among different kinds of harms, to probe the accuracy of 
information, and to calibrate sanctions. This rebellion against secrecy 
 
 22. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 307–08 (1950); infra 
notes 317–26 and accompanying text. 
 23. See, e.g., Samantha Schmidt, #MeToo: Harvey Weinstein Case Moves Thousands 




 24. Parallel bills were introduced in December of 2017 in the U.S. House of 
Representatives and in the Senate. See Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment 
Claims, H.R. 4570, 115th Cong. (2017); Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment 
Claims, S. 2203, 115th Cong. (2017). As discussed in Parts I and VI, arbitration is not 
intrinsically closed, and Congress and the courts can also bound the authority to impose 
blanket closures. 
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should therefore serve as a reminder of what public processes can 
offer: deliberate decision-making that insists on due process norms of 
even-handedness, screens information for reliability, and requires 
analysis of liability and remedies appropriate to the misconduct, when 
established. 
The question that becomes vivid by mixing this recent blast of 
publicity with the expanding modes of privatization is whether public 
performance of the power to resolve disputes remains central to 
legitimating authority. My worry is that providers of both public and 
private dispute resolution seem not to believe in the need to 
demonstrate the propriety of their exercise of authority. To stem 
“secrecy in courts” requires finding ways to generate, anew, 
commitments that the power to issue binding decisions about legal 
misbehavior depends on welcoming the public as central participants 
in the processes of judgment. 
II.  THE NORMATIVE IMPORT OF OPEN COURTS IN DEMOCRACIES 
“Open courts” is a phrase that references both the ability of third 
parties to watch proceedings and the ability of disputants to bring 
claims. As to the first sense of openness, a predicate question is 
whether claims for open courts are passé, in that many other 
institutions and technologies disseminate information about conflicts. 
As #MeToo makes plain, examples in this digital age are easy to 
provide. Another was when, in the spring of 2017, a video of airline 
employees dragging a seated, ticketed passenger from an airplane 
went “viral”25—a word apt to capture how information spread. 
In addition to new technologies and more outlets, the 
relationship of the body politic to information has changed. The legal 
regime spawned by the New Deal and reflected in the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure is credited to progressives, confident that the 
production of information would bring clarity about facts, obligations, 
outcomes, and justice. Not only are we now subject to information-
overload; we also live in a world of fact skeptics, “alternative fact” 
promoters, propaganda, and disinformation. The misuse of 
information is not novel, but the techniques for dissemination are, 
making plain that information per se is not an unvarnished public 
 
 25. Avi Selk & Lori Aratani, United Airlines CEO Apologizes for ‘Horrific Event,’ 
Promises Review of Policies After Passenger Violently Deplaned, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-gridlock/wp/2017/04/11/amid-pr-fiasco-
over-dragged-passenger-united-ceo-defends-his-crew/ [https://perma.cc/BW3G-KL8U]. 
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good. More than that, hackers and trollers abound, and revelations 
can unfairly subject individuals to harm.  
Yet it is precisely this plethora of information that makes court-
based production of knowledge (as contrasted to information) 
attractive. Once in the realm of adjudication, the modes of discourse 
are forced to change. A myriad of rules imposes codes of conduct for 
exchanges on paper and in person. Even as critics argue the decline of 
civility in the legal profession, court rules exclude “impertinent, or 
scandalous matter.”26 Parties are obliged to put forth specifics (often 
boringly repeated), and constitutional doctrine mandates that judges 
“hear the other side.”27 Further, eliciting competing accounts of what 
has transpired is built into the process. The relatively extravagant 
investment of resources (both public and private) in each case 
produces accounts of events linked to legal rights and obligations. 
When judges do make decisions on the bench or in writing, they 
are locked into relying on records and into weighing the legal import 
of facts. Although a few jurists are known for writing sentences 
providing sound bites for the media,28 judges are more often criticized 
for being hard to understand. In the last decades, courts have made 
efforts at translation, in part through hiring public information 
officers (organized enough so as to have their own acronym, “PIOs”), 
who send out press releases to explain the content of decisions.29 In 
short, even given a world replete with multiple sources of 
information, courts are distinctive in producing a unique form of 
knowledge. Newspapers may cut fact-checking staff,30 but courts 
cannot. 
A. Understanding the Function of the Public 
What are the utilities and the politics of this form of knowledge 
production and its relationship to justice? The classic arguments for 
openness in courts date from the nineteenth century when Jeremy 
 
 26. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f). 
 27. See JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, 
CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 288–
305 (2011) [hereinafter RESNIK & CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE]. 
 28. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 827–28 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting, 
joined by Roberts, C.J., Thomas & Alito, JJ.) (“[The majority’s opinion] will almost 
certainly cause more Americans to be killed.”). 
 29. See Welcome from the President, CONFERENCE OF COURT PUB. INFO. OFFICERS, 
https://www.ccpio.org/about/welcome/ [https://perma.cc/G73N-VR5K]. 
 30. See Sydney Ember, Times Staff Members Protest Cuts and Changes to News 
Operation, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/29/business
/media/new-york-times-staff-members-protest-cuts.html [https://perma.cc/7HYM-VQDZ 
(dark archive)]. 
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Bentham offered a fierce defense for what he termed “publicity,” an 
attribute he advocated for all facets of government.31 For Bentham, 
publicity made several contributions. A first was truth; he thought 
that public access to witness testimony would serve as “a check upon 
mendacity and incorrectness”—that public disclosures would make it 
easier to identify false statements.32 
Another was education, in that judges would want to explain 
their actions to those watching them.33 Courts were therefore both 
“schools” and “theatres of justice.”34 And famously, Bentham lauded 
publicity’s disciplinary powers: “the more strictly we are watched, the 
better we behave.”35 
The desired end point for Bentham was to enable the public to 
function as a “half real and half imaginary” Tribunal of Public 
Opinion able to know the process of decision-making and the bases 
for the outcomes and, therefore to assess whether the rules 
comported with its interests.36 Bentham’s interest in making elites 
accountable37 relied on what Robert Post recently termed a 
populace’s “democratic competency,” stemming from “access to 
disciplinary knowledge.”38 Post argued that the need for this form of 
literacy explained commitments to free speech and a free press.39 His 
 
 31. “Without publicity all other checks are insufficient: in comparison with publicity, 
all other checks are of small account.” JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL 
EVIDENCE: SPECIALLY APPLIED TO ENGLISH PRACTICE (1827), reprinted in 6 THE 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 189, 351 (John Bowring ed., 1843) [hereinafter BENTHAM, 
RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE]. Bentham (in)famously argued for the panopticon 
prison, but his commitment to disciplinary surveillance was not limited to that setting. He 
also proposed that the “doors of all public establishments ought to be thrown wide open to 
the body of the curious at large—the great open committee of the tribunal of the world.” 
JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON; OR, THE INSPECTION-HOUSE (1791), reprinted in 4 
THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 37, 46 (John Bowring ed., 1843). 
 32. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, supra note 31, at 355. 
 33. Id. at 356–57. 
 34. Id. at 354–55. 
 35. JEREMY BENTHAM, FARMING DEFENDED (1796), reprinted in 1 WRITINGS ON 
THE POOR LAWS 276, 277 (Michael Quinn ed., 2001). 
 36. FREDERICK ROSEN, JEREMY BENTHAM AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: 
A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CODE 26–27 (1983) [hereinafter, ROSEN, BENTHAM 
AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY]; see also Fred Cutler, Jeremy Bentham and the 
Public Opinion Tribunal, 63 PUB. OPINION Q. 321, 321 (1999). 
 37. ROSEN, BENTHAM AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 36, at 13–14. 
 38. ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 27 (2017). Post thus explored 
the propriety of some forms of regulation under the First Amendment in the United States 
as he parsed the distinct values of “democratic legitimation” and “democratic 
competence.” See id. at 27–60. 
 39. See id. at 61–93. 
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concept also has application to courts, which serve as a training 
ground for such competence. 
My account of the function of courts therefore adds to 
Bentham’s claims about their educative, disciplinary, and 
informational utilities, and to Post’s formulation of the mechanisms 
for developing democratic competency. I need to flag that when using 
the term “democracy” in the context of courts, I am not focused, as 
many others are, on the role played by lay jurors, temporarily holding 
the state’s power to render judgment.40 The aspect of “the 
democratic” in courts at issue here is that courts provide 
opportunities to watch state actors in action, as they accord (or fail to 
provide) dignified treatment to litigants, lawyers, and witnesses. The 
public also can see that disputants (be they employee or employer, 
prisoner or prison official) are required to treat each other civilly as 
they argue in public about their disagreements, misbehavior, 
wrongdoing, and obligations. Litigation is a social practice that forces 
dialogue upon the unwilling (including the government) and 
momentarily alters configurations of authority. 
Public access to courts enables observers to see what democratic 
precepts of equal access to the law and equal treatment by the law 
mean in practice. Bentham thought that courts provided education 
because judges would naturally want to explain their decisions to 
their audience. For me, the state is not only a teacher but also a 
student, reminded that all of us have entitlements in democracies to 
watch power operate and to receive explanations for the exercise of 
power that dispute resolution entails. The observers are, in this 
account, a necessary part of the practice of adjudication, anchored in 
democratic political norms that the state cannot impose its authority 
through unseen and unaccountable acts. Therefore courts are, like 
legislatures, a place in which democratic practices can occur in real 
time. 
When Bentham wrote, courts were not venues available to all. 
Employees could not call their employers to account, and prisoners 
could not challenge their custodians. Individuals did not have 
protection from abusive family members, and gender and racial 
discrimination were licit. Twentieth-century egalitarian movements 
produced a mix of constitutional and statutory law that recognized all 
persons as entitled to equal treatment and thereby welcomed an array 
 
 40. See, e.g., Tatjana Hörnle, Democratic Accountability and Lay Participation in 
Criminal Trials, in 2 THE TRIAL ON TRIAL: JUDGMENT AND CALLING TO ACCOUNT 135–
53 (Antony Duff, Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall & Victor Tadros eds., 2006). 
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of new participants into the democratic venues that courts were 
becoming.41 
B. Expanding Authority to Bring Claims 
The aspirations for adjudication in public venues are, however, 
haunted by challenges in making its processes equally available across 
class lines. In Bentham’s era, as in ours, the costs of litigation posed 
problems, which brings me to the second sense of openness, focused 
on the capacity of disputants to bring claims. Bentham called the fees 
imposed by courts a “tax on distress,”42 as he promoted subsidies for 
those too poor to participate.43 He also proposed the establishment of 
an “Equal Justice Fund,” supported by using the “fines imposed on 
wrongdoers,” government funds, and charitable donations.44 Bentham 
wanted not only to subsidize the “costs of legal assistance but also the 
costs of transporting witnesses” and the production of other 
evidence.45 To lower costs, Bentham proposed that judges be 
available “every hour on every day of the year,”46 and he suggested 
that courts be on a time “budget” that would shorten proceedings to 
one-day trials and include immediate decisions.47 
As the twentieth century ushered in new rights-holders, 
inequalities became yet more acute. The U.S. Supreme Court 
responded by insisting that courts be “open” in the sense of being 
accessible even to those who could not pay entry fees for certain 
kinds of claims. The canonical decision, Boddie v. Connecticut,48 stems 
from the early 1970s, when a class of “welfare recipients residing in 
Connecticut” argued that, by failing to create a method by which 
 
 41. See RESNIK & CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE, supra note 27, at 288–89. 
 42. JEREMY BENTHAM, A PROTEST AGAINST LAW-TAXES (1793), reprinted in 2 THE 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 573, 582 (John Bowring ed., 1843). 
 43. ROSEN, BENTHAM AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 36, at 153–
55. 
 44. Id. at 153–54; PHILLIP SCHOFIELD, UTILITY AND DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL 
THOUGHT OF JEREMY BENTHAM 310 (2006). 
 45. ROSEN, BENTHAM AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 36, at 153–
54. 
 46. Thomas P. Peardon, Bentham’s Ideal Republic, 17 CAN. J. ECON. & POL. SCI. 184, 
196 (1951). Rosen described Bentham’s goal as having all persons, on foot, be able to 
reach a local judicial officer and return home without having to pay to find a place to sleep 
over night. ROSEN, BENTHAM AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 36, at 
149. To lessen expense, Bentham also proposed a system of “referees” or “arbitration” 
overseen by judges. Id. at 151. 
 47. See Anthony J. Draper, “Corruptions in the Administration of Justice”: Bentham’s 
Critique of Civil Procedure, 1806-1811, J. BENTHAM STUD., Jan. 2004, at 1, 19, 
http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1323720/1/007_Draper_2004.pdf [https://perma.cc/L96N-5KNJ].  
 48. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
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to waive the sixty dollars for filing and service required to obtain a 
divorce, the state had violated their federal constitutional 
rights.49 
In 1971, Justice Harlan agreed; he wrote for the Court that the 
combination of “the basic position of the marriage relationship in 
this society’s hierarchy of values and the .	.	.	state monopolization” 
of lawful dissolution resulted in a due process obligation for the state 
to provide access.50 Although the concurrences argued for broader 
principles that would have applied beyond the context of divorce,51 
Justice Harlan’s language shaped a narrow obligation to waive fees 
that permitted other exclusionary fees to remain in place. For 
example, the Court thereafter refused to require fee waivers when 
individuals sought to challenge a reduction in welfare benefits or 
when filing for bankruptcy.52 The parameters of the constitutional 
constraints on court charges has, as detailed in Part IV, returned to 
the fore as the kinds and numbers of court assessments have 
multiplied, with jurisdictions raising fees and “surcharges” in civil, 
criminal, and traffic filings. 
Other constitutional democracies have taken a broader view of 
the obligation to reduce economic barriers to courts. Recent decisions 
from both the Supreme Courts of Canada and of the United Kingdom 
are illustrative. In 2014, the Canadian Supreme Court found 
impermissible an escalating set of fees charged by British Columbia 
when litigants’ trials lasted for more than three days.53 Relying on 
Section 96 of its Constitution Act of 1867 (providing that the 
“Governor General shall appoint the Judges” of provincial courts),54 
the Court concluded that litigants had a right to “section 96 courts.”55 
As a consequence, British Columbia could not charge hundreds of 
dollars if doing so imposed an “undue hardship,” even for persons 
 
 49. Id. at 372. 
 50. Id. at 347. 
 51. Id. at 383 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 387 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 52. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 658–61 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409 
U.S. 434, 446 (1973); see also Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T 
v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 86 
(2011) [hereinafter Resnik, Fairness in Numbers]. 
 53. Trial Lawyers Ass’n of B.C. v. British Columbia, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 31, paras. 35–36 
(Can.). 
 54. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, § 96 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, 
app. II, no. 5 (Can.). 
 55. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 3 S.C.R. at para. 29. 
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who were not “indigent” and therefore not exempt under the 
statute.56 
In 2017, the U.K. Supreme Court took a similar approach when it 
invalidated the high fees imposed by the government on claimants in 
its employment tribunals.57 While the schedule varied with the kind of 
claims brought by employees, fees ran from £1,200 to £7,200 at the 
trial level, to be paid in different stages for filing, hearings, and the 
like. In contrast, fees in small claims courts were pegged to the value 
of the claim and ranged from £50 to £745.58 
Remissions (fee waivers) were available in the employment 
tribunals. But the U.K. Supreme Court found the increased fees 
unlawful, given that a “right of access to the courts is inherent in the 
rule of law” and that the administration of justice was not “merely a 
public service like any other.”59 The U.K. Supreme Court spoke not 
only of the value of producing precedent, but also emphasized that 
businesses need to know, on the one hand, that they will be able 
to enforce their rights if they have to do so, and, on the other 
hand, that if they fail to meet their obligations, there is likely to 
be a remedy against them. It is that knowledge which underpins 
everyday economic and social relations.60  
Like the Canadian Supreme Court, the U.K. Supreme Court 
reasoned that obligations to pay fees ought not be tied only to 
poverty. Rather, the question was the impact of fees “in the real 
world”; when low or middle-income households had to forego “the 
ordinary and reasonable expenditure required to maintain what 
would generally be regarded as an acceptable standard of living, the 
fees cannot be regarded as affordable.”61 
These decisions reflect an understanding of the need for 
governments to provide courts as a service, akin to roads and mail 
 
 56. Id. at paras. 46, 52. Thereafter, British Columbia amended its fee rules. See B.C. 
SUP. CT. CIV. R. 20-5(1). That rule authorizes judges to waive fees if imposing an “undue 
hardship” unless the judge determines that “no reasonable claim or defense” is made, or 
the case is otherwise abusive. Id. 
 57. R (on the application of UNISON) v. Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51, [117] 
(Lord Reed). 
 58. Id. at [16]–[20]; see also Abi Adams & Jeremias Prassl, Vexatious Claims: 
Challenging the Case for Employment Tribunal Fees, 80 MODERN L. REV. 412, 414, 418 
(2017). These economists modeled the impact of the tribunal fees on filings. 
 59. R (on the application of UNISON), [2017] UKSC at [66]. Lady Hale’s opinion 
focused on the discriminatory disparate impact of the fees. Id. at [121]–[34] (Lady Hale). 
 60. Id. at [71] (Lord Reed). The court also commented: “That is so, notwithstanding 
that judicial enforcement of the law is not usually necessary, and notwithstanding that the 
resolution of disputes by other methods is often desirable.” Id. 
 61. Id. at [93]. 
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and, in some countries, to education and housing. Such affirmative 
obligations are often termed “social and economic rights.” Yet, in 
contrast to more conventional social and economic rights, courts 
support the flourishing not only of individuals but also of the 
governments that deploy them. States rely on courts to justify their 
power, to implement their norms, and to protect their economies. 
It is the mix of state needs for legitimacy and demands for equal 
treatment that has produced the proposition that individuals who are 
poor as well as those with resources ought to have access to courts, at 
least for certain kinds of claims. These are the changes that 
democracy has pressed upon courts, now understood as intrinsically 
obliged to offer rights of court access and of dignified and equal 
treatment for all participants. 
This account is of course aspirational. Treating all people fairly 
requires work, and responding to economic disparities among litigants 
is challenging. Moreover, lawsuits can be used exploitatively, 
imposing costs on defendants who ought not to have been brought 
into court. The difficulties of calibrating rules to respond to that 
strategic interaction while protecting access for meritorious claims are 
legion. Many court systems have tried to address these problems, as 
reflected in repeated waves of procedural reforms including the 
creation of small claims courts, worker compensation systems, and 
today’s forms of ADR. 
In addition, beginning in the 1980s, state and federal judiciaries 
chartered task forces to explore how gender, race, and ethnicity 
affected the courts; that research found systemic problems.62 In more 
recent decades, the focus has shifted to the high costs of legal services 
and to the proliferation of assessments imposed by courts to fund 
themselves and municipal services more generally.63 As discussed in 
Part IV, a spate of litigation, court-based A2J task forces, and many 
articles document the ways in which governments use courts to 
extract fees, sometimes to support their own programs and sometimes 
as sources of general revenue. That mix makes public oversight one 
mechanism for interrupting some of the burdens imposed by LFOs. 
 
 62. For an overview of these tasks forces and their findings, see generally Judith 
Resnik, Asking About Gender in Courts, 21 SIGNS 952 (1996) [hereinafter Resnik, Asking 
About Gender in Courts]. 
 63. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield & Jamie Heine, Life in the Law-Thick World: Legal 
Resources for Ordinary Americans, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN 
AMERICA 21, 21–51 (Sam Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., 2016); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 42–62 
(2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03
/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MV5-CNFU]. 
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III.  MAKING COURTS AND ARBITRATION PUBLIC OR PRIVATE 
A. That All Persons “May Freely Come Into, and Attend” 
Old and new provisions mandate what today goes under the 
moniker of “sunshine” in the courts. The history of the public 
performance of state power long predates the US Constitution. The 
1676 Charter of the English Colony of West New Jersey is one 
example, providing that “in all publick courts of justice for tryals of 
causes, civil or criminal, any person or persons	.	.	. may freely come 
into, and attend.”64 
 By the eighteenth century, the new states in North America had 
embraced this idea, turning “rites”—the rituals of public performance 
of power—into “rights”—the authority of observers to insist on their 
place in courts. Several early state constitutions echo the Magna 
Carta, with clauses promising remedies for harms to persons and their 
property and adding the words “all courts shall be open.”65 For 
example, Alabama’s 1819 Constitution provided that “[a]ll courts 
shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his lands, 
goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
and right and justice administered, without sale, denial, or delay.”66 A 
similar provision can be found in Missouri’s 1820 Constitution: 
That courts of justice ought to be open to every person, and 
certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, property, or 
character; and that right and justice ought to be administered 
without sale, denial, or delay; and that no private property 
ought to be taken or applied to public use without just 
compensation.67 
The caveat is that “every person” was not all of “us.” Indeed, 
Missouri’s 1820 Constitution expressly protected slave owners by 
providing that its general assembly had “no power to pass laws	.	.	. 
 
 64. CONCESSIONS AND AGREEMENTS OF WEST NEW JERSEY (1677), reprinted in 
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 184, 188 (Richard L. Perry & 
John C. Cooper eds., 1959). 
 65. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 12; see also Judith Resnik, Constitutional 
Entitlements to and in Courts: Remedial Rights in an Age of Egalitarianism: The Childress 
Lecture, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 917, 923 (2012) [hereinafter Resnik, Constitutional 
Entitlements]. 
 66. ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 14. An almost identical clause can be found in the 
current Alabama Constitution, ratified in 1901. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13. 
 67. MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII § 7. 
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[f]or the emancipation of slaves without the consent of their 
owners.”68 
The protection of property holders was not limited to slave 
owners. Historians identify the insertion of rights-to-remedy clauses 
as stemming from creditors’ concerns that “renegade legislatures” 
could try to protect debtors by limiting contract obligations.69 Thus, 
these clauses are early examples of Galanter’s repeat players, seeking 
rules (in this instance of access to courts) to protect their interests in 
property and status-conventional relationships. (And, as detailed in 
Part IV, recent data on state court users suggest the growing 
dominance of creditors’ claims.) 
The idea of courts as sources of the recognition of all persons as 
equal rights-holders and as ready resources for the array of humanity 
is an artifact in the United States of both the first and second 
Reconstruction. Not until well into the twentieth century did U.S. law 
and practice fully embrace the proposition that whatever one’s race, 
gender, or class, courts had to welcome all entrants.70 “Every person” 
came to reference all of “us” as a result of twentieth-century 
aspirations that democratic orders provide “equal justice under law,” a 
phrase etched in 1935 above the steps to the U.S. Supreme Court but 
not inclusive in the way we understand it today until decades 
thereafter.71 
During the second half of the twentieth century, legislatures and 
courts recognized new kinds of harms as coming within the rubric of 
what constituted a legal injury. Rights to be free from discrimination 
are vivid examples, as are the developments of rights for consumers, 
employees, household members, and criminal defendants. As courts 
became more accessible to such claimants, the stakes of openness 
changed. Remedies obtained in courts underscored for some the 
importance of openness and sparked efforts by others, unhappy at 
having to disgorge information and to provide remedies, to try to 
 
 68. Id. art. III, § 26. 
 69. See Kilmer v. Mun, 17 S.W.3d 545, 548 (Mo. 2000) (en banc) (quoting David 
Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1992)). Indeed, in 1946, 
Missouri’s Supreme Court relied on its remedy clause to protect segregated housing by 
holding that racially restrictive covenants were enforceable, in part to avoid denying court 
access for enforcement of contractual obligations. Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.W.2d 679, 683 
(Mo. 1946) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds sub nom, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 70. Practices, of course, have not always mapped onto these aspirations. See Resnik, 
Asking About Gender in Courts, supra note 62, at 952–54. 
 71. See Judith Resnik & Dennis E. Curtis, Inventing Democratic Courts: A New and 
Iconic Supreme Court, 38 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 207, 233 (2013). 
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limit both the ability to bring claims to open courts and the 
opportunity to learn about others’ allegations. 
B. Sunshine in Government and in its Courts 
Open-court practices in the United States reflect a more general 
view of public rights to observe government. Commitments to protect 
public access come from both federal and state constitutions. The 
U.S. Constitution provides that Congress “keep a journal of its 
Proceedings” and publish it periodically, subject to its “Judgment” on 
a need for “Secrecy.”72 Congress is also obliged to make and publish a 
“regular Statement and Account” of its use of public monies.73 
Statutes such as the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 demonstrate 
popular support to put such obligations (albeit with caveats and 
exceptions) into place.74 
While the U.S. Constitution does not have the language common 
to many state constitutions mandating that “all courts shall be open,” 
the Sixth Amendment provides an express guarantee to criminal 
defendants of a “speedy and public trial” before a jury drawn from 
the vicinage.75 The scope of the provision is brought into question 
when the public is excluded from criminal proceedings. The case law 
has recognized both defendants’ rights to have an audience76 and the 
public’s First Amendment rights to be an audience.77 Rights of 
assembly and to petition for redress are sometimes also cited as bases 
for the public’s entitlement to open courts.78 
 
 72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. Section 7 required recording the names of persons voting 
“Yeas and Nays.” Id. art. I, § 7. 
 73. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. Implementation comes from the Congressional Record and the 
Government Printing Office. Court enforcement has, however, been made difficult by 
rulings concluding that individuals lack standing to seek enforcement. See, e.g., United 
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 167–68, 170 (1974). Richardson found that the Court’s 
doctrine on standing prevented reaching the merits of a challenge to the CIA’s 
withholding of information on its expenditures. Id. 
 74. See Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (codified 
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)). 
 75. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 76. See, e.g., Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1905 (2017); Presley v. 
Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 210–11, 216 (2010). 
 77. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 503–05 
(1984); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 559–63, 580 (1980) (plurality 
opinion); see also Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 
405, 409 (1987) [hereinafter Resnik, Public Dimension]. The Sixth Amendment right of 
the defendant is sometimes either itself the basis of access by third parties or related to a 
First Amendment right or “freedom” of the public to “listen.” Richmond Newspapers, 448 
U.S. at 576. 
 78. For example, prisoners have rights of access to bring claims, and in the discussion 
of such cases, the Court has on occasion referenced petitioning rights. The central decision 
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As noted, state constitutional provisions often have texts 
directing openness. Florida offers an exemplar of the depth of 
commitments to “sunshine laws.” Its Constitution of 1839 had a 
familiar rendition of the “open courts/rights-to-remedies” text,79 
which was updated in 1968 to be gender neutral.80 A new provision, 
added in 2002, protected public access to proceedings in other 
branches of government by giving “[e]very person” rights to “inspect 
or copy any public record,” including materials from the legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches.81 That amendment reflects an 
important substantive point: that an insistence on openness comes 
from political and social movements; a referendum produced the 
amendment to the Florida Constitution.82 
 
of Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977), was limited in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 
351 (1996). In finding that states have “affirmative obligations to assure all prisoners 
meaningful access to the courts,” the Bounds Court emphasized the role that law libraries 
and other legal assistance play in helping prisoners prepare for their defense. Bounds, 430 
U.S. at 824–26. But several years later, the Court in Lewis held that “Bounds did not 
create an abstract, free standing right to a law library or legal assistance.” Lewis, 518 U.S. 
at 351. Rights of assembly are discussed in United Mine Workers v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 
U.S. 217, 221–22 (1967). 
 79. FLA. CONST. of 1839, art. I, § 9 (“That all courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law; and right and justice administered, without sale, denial, or delay.”). 
 80. FLA. CONST. of 1968, art. I, § 21 (“The courts shall be open to every 
person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, 
denial or delay.”). 
 81. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(a) (“Every person has the right to inspect or copy any 
public record made or received in connection with the official business of any public body, 
officer, or employee of the state. . . . This section specifically includes the legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches of government.”). 
 82. Florida had a 1905 public access law applicable to “formal” municipal meetings. 
Act of May 24, 1905, ch. 5463, 1905 Fla. Sess. Laws 157, 157 (repealed 1974) (“All 
meetings of any City or Town Council or Board of Aldermen of any City or Town in the 
State of Florida, shall be held open to the public of any such City or Town, and all Records 
and Books of any such City or Town shall be at all times open to the inspection of any 
citizens thereof.”). A more general statute protected public access in 1967. Act of July 1, 
1967, ch. 67-356, 1967 Fla. Sess. Laws 1147, 1147–48 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 286.011 (West, Westlaw through the 2017 First Reg. Sess. and Special “A” Sess.)). 
After a 1978 Constitution Revision Commission had proposed a constitutional provision, 
which was not enacted, the Florida Supreme Court held that the public records law did not 
apply to the legislature. See Locke v. Hawkes, 595 So. 2d 32, 37 (Fla. 1992). 
  Popular support for making the change followed, resulting in open access at state 
and local levels. See William A. Buzzett & Deborah K. Kearney, Commentary to 1992 
Addition, art. I, § 24 (1992 Comm. Substitute for House Joint Resolutions 1727, 863 & 
2035). As they explain, the Florida Supreme Court’s decision 
meant that records of legislators, as well as those of the governor and cabinet 
officers, at least with respect to the exercise of their constitutional powers, were 
not subject to the law. The decision caused a stir among the public and particularly 
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The 2002 amendment, focused on branches of government other 
than the judiciary, interacts with Florida’s Sunshine in Litigation Act, 
prohibiting courts from entering an order whose “purpose or effect” 
is to conceal “a public hazard or any information concerning a public 
hazard.”83 Also prohibited are court orders and judgments cutting off 
“any information which may be useful to members of the public in 
protecting themselves from injury which may result from the public 
hazard.”84 At least twenty other states have statutes or court rules 
constraining in various ways the ability to make unavailable court 
documents and outcomes.85 Some of these obligations came in 
response to suppression of information in cases alleging abuse of 
children by members of the clergy or about harms caused by faulty 
products such as exploding lighters, just as #MeToo is prompting 
efforts to curb nondisclosure agreements (“NDAs”) involving sexual 
misconduct.86 
 
the press. Efforts were quickly begun for constitutional change, which concluded 
with the successful passage of this amendment. 
Id.; see also Sandra F. Chance & Christina Locke, The Government-in-the Sunshine 
Law Then and Now: A Model for Implementing New Technologies Consistent with 
Florida’s Position as a Leader in Open Government, 35 FLA. ST. L. REV. 245, 247–57 
(2008). 
 83. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(7) (West, Westlaw through the 2017 First Reg. Sess. 
and Special “A” Sess.). In 1999, Florida also required that its Department of Public Health 
publish on the Internet payment of malpractice claims in excess of a specified amount. Id. 
§ 627.912(6)(a) (Westlaw). 
 84. Id. § 69.081(3) (Westlaw). 
 85. Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public 
Dimensions of Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 564 (2006); 
see also Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing 
Public Access to Information Generated through Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375, 380 
(2006). A list of state open records laws can be found at Open Government Guide, 
REPORTERS COMM. FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (2011), https://www.rcfp.org/open-
government-guide [https://perma.cc/Y7WP-FP6S]. See also State Public Record Laws, 
FOIADVOCATES (2018), http://www.foiadvocates.com/records.html [https://perma.cc
/M9EX-67G3]. 
 86. New York case law describes the “broad presumption that the public is entitled to 
access to judicial proceedings and court records.” Mosallem v. Berenson, 905 N.Y.S. 2d 
575, 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 216.1(a) 
(2017). Some states have provisions focused on disclosure of settlements as well. See, e.g., 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-17a (West, Westlaw through 2017 Jan. Reg. Sess. and 2017 
June Special Sess.) (requiring that, “[u]pon entry of any medical malpractice award or 
upon entering a settlement of a malpractice claim” against those licensed under other 
provisions, the entity making payment or the party is to notify the Department of Public 
Health of “the terms of the award or settlement” as well as to provide a copy along with 
the complaint and answer); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:9-22.21 to 9-22.25 (West, Westlaw 
through 2017) (originally enacted in June of 2003 and requiring that all “medical 
malpractice court judgments and all medical malpractice arbitration awards” in which a 
complaining party had received an award within the five most recent years be made 
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These state practices are the tip of what at the outset I termed 
the doctrinal openness of courts, supported by an array of 
constitutional provisions and statutes. Open court directives in state 
constitutions are but one piece of the scaffolding that supports a 
shared sense that courts are intrinsically open. Adding to the edifice 
of openness are rights to jury trials in civil and criminal cases, coupled 
with criminal defendants’ rights to confrontation, cross-examination, 
and, as mentioned, a “speedy and public trial,” as well as English 
common law traditions. 
Atop this mélange of constitutional and common law comes a 
host of statutes and regulations directing both federal and state 
judiciaries to publish a wealth of data about themselves. Public 
records name every judge appointed in the federal and state systems. 
Statistics on cases come from systems begun in the nineteenth 
century. In 1871, the Attorney General of the United States began 
providing compilations on caseloads.87 That task was taken over in 
1939 by the Administrative Office of the United States (“AO”), 
which works with federal district and appellate courts to file reports 
annually on the “business” of the federal courts.88 
This documentation is not only predicated on ideologies 
promoting open courts; the documentation is also embedded in the 
political economy of courts. Judges need to convince their coordinate 
branches to provide funding, and the statistics on demand for services 
are regularly submitted as evidence of the needs for support. The 
federal judiciary continues to be successful in maintaining its budget 
allocations even as other segments of the government have suffered 
cuts. For fiscal year 2017, the federal judiciary requested (and 
 
available to the public in profiles of physicians and podiatrists licensed to practice in the 
state of New Jersey); see also Med. Soc’y of N.J. v. Mottola, 320 F. Supp. 2d 254 (D.N.J. 
2004) (holding New Jersey Health Care Consumer Information Act valid under federal 
Health Care Quality Improvement Act and U.S. Constitution). 
  Federal legislation has been proposed but not enacted that would limit the 
issuance of protective orders for materials provided through discovery and require judges 
not to enforce provisions in settlements mandating nondisclosure (aside from funds paid) 
of terms “relevant to the protection of public health or safety.” See Sunshine in Litigation 
Act of 2017, H.R. 1053, 115th Cong. § 2(c)(1) (2017). 
 87. See PETER G. FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 91–
95 (1973); David S. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal 
District Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 97 (1981). 
 88. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 601, 604, 610 (2012). The Director of the AO files reports 
annually. See, e.g., Judicial Business 2016, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2016 [https://perma.cc/NBU6-
P9WC]. For the history of the development of this administrative apparatus, see Judith 
Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 924, 937–38 (2000). 
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received) some seven billion dollars in discretionary appropriations, a 
3.2% increase above fiscal year 2016 funding.89 
With the advent of PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic 
Records), computer docketing puts federal court filings into a public 
database permitting readers to view pleadings and to track the 
submissions and dispositions in particular cases.90 As computer-
facilitated access replaces labor-intensive searches through file 
drawers, problems familiar to computer users emerge about how to 
protect public information while recognizing the privacy interests of 
individuals.91 For example, certain forms of personal information, 
such as Social Security numbers, are redacted. Concern about 
litigants’ vulnerability is also the basis for federal appellate rules 
limiting remote electronic access by the public (but not the 
government) to documents in immigration cases.92 
Obligations to report judicial statistics exist in the states,93 albeit 
often supported by fewer resources than in the federal system. The 
 
 89. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE JUDICIARY FY 2018 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET SUMMARY REVISED i (2017) [hereinafter FY 2018 JUDICIARY 
BUDGET], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fy_2018_congressional_budget
_summary_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/AC2Q-P2RB]; Judiciary Transmits Fiscal Year 2017 
Budget Request to Congress, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (Feb. 12, 2016), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2016/02/12/judiciary-transmits-fiscal-year-2017-budget-request-
congress [https://perma.cc/76B2-YJPB]. For fiscal year 2018, the courts requested $7.19 
billion, a 3.8% increase over the previous year. FY 2018 JUDICIARY BUDGET, supra, at i. 
 90. See PACER, https://www.pacer.gov [http://perma.cc/94AA-3GCV]. 
 91. See David S. Ardia, Privacy and Court Records: Online Access and the Loss of 
Practical Obscurity, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1385, 1387; Karen Eltis, The Judicial System in 
the Digital Age: Revisiting the Relationship between Privacy and Accessibility in the Cyber 
Context, 56 MCGILL L.J. 289, 295–300 (2011); Nancy S. Marder, From “Practical 
Obscurity” to Web Disclosure: A New Understanding of Public Information, 59 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 441, 443–50 (2009); see also B.C. CIVIL RESOLUTION TRIBUNAL, ACCESS TO 
RECORDS AND INFORMATION IN CRT DISPUTES: POLICY 001-20151215, at 1–5, 12–17 
(2015) [hereinafter BRITISH COLUMBIA CRT, ACCESS TO RECORDS], 
https://civilresolutionbc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Access-to-Info-in-CRT-Case-
Records.pdf [https://perma.cc/P542-ZNW8]. 
 92. See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a)–(c); FED. R. APP. P. 25(a)(5); Conference on Privacy 
and Internet Access to Court Files, Panel Two: Should There be Remote Access to Court 
Filings in Immigration Cases?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 25, 25 (2010). 
 93. See ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN, RICHARD Y. SCHAUFFLER, SHAUNA M. 
STRICKLAND & KATHRYN A. HOLT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE 
WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 1–2 (2012), 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/OtherPages/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/
CSP_DEC.ashx [http://perma.cc/NXV9-BYSX]; NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE 
COURT GUIDE TO STATISTICAL REPORTING 1 (2017) http://www.courtstatistics.org/~
/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/State%20Court%20Guide%20to%20Statistical%20Reporting
%20v%202point1point2.ashx [https://perma.cc/FF23-VWGR]; Reporting Excellence 
Awards, 2016, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS. (2016), http://www.courtstatistics.org
/Other-Pages/Awards.aspx [https://perma.cc/56F7-G4T9]. 
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Court Statistics Act in Illinois is illustrative, as it requires officials to 
provide “information, statistical data, and reports bearing on the state 
of the dockets and business transacted by the courts and other 
matters pertinent to the efficient operation of the judicial system.”94 
Implementation can be complex because Illinois, like some other 
states, does not have a “unified” system. Each county has degrees of 
autonomy that make data collection challenging, which is also 
reflected in efforts by the Illinois Task Force on Court Assessments to 
identify the welter of fees that each county can impose.95 In short, 
through constitutional doctrine, rulemaking, litigant filings, task 
forces, obligations to account for funds, and the need to obtain more, 
courts are “a huge information system—an entity that receives, 
processes, stores, creates, monitors, and disseminates large quantities 
of documents and information.”96 
C. Functional Privatization in Courts, Arbitration, and Online 
The shape of this “huge information system” requires further 
interrogation, as do ideas about its dissemination and its relationship 
to knowledge and to justice. Here the plot thickens, as I turn from 
doctrinal openness to what happens at a functional level, where there 
is less to see than one would expect. 
Four sets of practices (as they are currently formatted) close off 
public purview. One is the reformatting of rules of court to shift from 
adjudication toward management and settlement. Another is the 
devolution of court authority to agencies that often do not provide 
ready access to their adjudicatory processes. A third is online dispute 
resolution, which relies on computer exchanges among disputants and 
sometimes third parties to resolve conflict. A fourth (that may also 
use web-based technologies) is the outsourcing to arbitrators or other 
private providers, who in turn impose mandates (generally enforced 
by courts) to keep arbitration processes bilateral and confidential. 
I do not here debate whether mediation, early neutral 
evaluation, ODR, arbitration, and other forms of resolution are 
 
 94. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/1 (West, Westlaw through Pub. Acts effective Jan. 
8, 2018). The Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts (“AOIC”)—like its counterparts 
across the country—issues annual reports containing caseload statistics, disposition 
information, and more. See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE ILL. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 
OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS: STATISTICAL SUMMARY 101 (2015), 
http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/SupremeCourt/AnnualReport/2015/2015_Statistical_Summary.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/RWF3-8B9J]. 
 95. ILLINOIS COURT ASSESSMENTS 2016, supra note 19, at 1–2. 
 96. RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?: RETHINKING THE NATURE OF 
LEGAL SERVICES 201 (2008). 
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“good” on the variety of metrics (speed, accuracy, economy, 
informality, generativity, etc.) that have been discussed.97 My focus is 
on the impact of the shifts to these processes on access to knowledge 
about justice-seeking. My questions are about the ease of knowing 
their rules, watching their processes, and learning their outcomes 
under the frameworks shaped through thousands of alternative civil 
procedural rules. 
 
1.  Court-Based Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Various forms of ADR are based in courts and organized by 
national and state statutes, and by local rules that suggest or require 
the use of mediation, arbitration, and other settlement-focused 
techniques. Those rules rarely reference the public. To the extent 
third parties are mentioned, the context is usually an admonition that 
confidentiality is required of participants in court-based ADR 
processes. 
An example comes from the federal courts. As is familiar, in 
1983, and then again in 1993, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
were revised to promote conflict management and settlement in lieu 
of adjudication.98 These changes represent a movement away from the 
1938 court-based litigation model (with its due process predicates) to 
what I have suggested should be called “Contract Procedure,”99 in 
which judges strive to end cases through agreements.100 
Central to this shift have been amendments to Rule 16, 
governing pretrial procedures in civil cases in federal court. In 
contrast to criminal rules in which court-based activities such as 
“pleas, sentencing, case conferences, and adjournments” are generally 
held in courtrooms,101 the civil rules do not specify that pretrial 
 
 97. See, e.g., Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, What We Know (and Need to Know) 
about Court-Annexed Dispute Resolution, 67 S.C. L. REV. 245, 245–47, 262–65 (2016). 
 98. Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 612–14 
(2003) [hereinafter Resnik, Procedure as Contract]; see also Judith Resnik, Managerial 
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376–80 (1982). 
 99. Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 98, at 598. 
 100. Ellen E. Deason, Beyond “Managerial Judges”: Appropriate Roles in Settlement, 
78 OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 88–104 (2017). 
 101. Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 2173, 2175 (2014); see also El Vocero de P.R. v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 
147–50 (1993); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8–13 
(1986); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 505–10 (1984). 
  Simonson argued that the U.S. Constitution obliges judiciaries to keep all non-
trial criminal adjudication open and that, given the decline of jury trials, this right is under-
enforced. Simonson, supra, at 2177–79, 2206–21. Her examples included the routine 
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meetings be open to the public or on the record.102 As I noted at the 
outset, some judges do their pretrial work on the bench and on the 
record. Others do so in chambers, in part based on the view that 
privacy facilitates agreements and that concessions are more readily 
made if they cannot be used later at trial or in other proceedings.103 
Other changes to the Federal Rules also move information away 
from public access. Discovery materials are no longer routinely filed 
in courts unless appended to motions; pre-discovery confidentiality 
agreements have become routine.104 Settlements conditioned on non-
disclosure of terms are commonplace, as reflected both in the NDA 
acronym for them and by recent accounts of sexual harassment claims 
that had been settled by requiring silence.105 Even when settlements 
are presented in courts, facets may remain undisclosed.106 
2.  Online Dispute Resolution 
ODR is a form of ADR using web-based technologies that can 
turn computers into venues for dispute resolution.107 Expanding use 
of e-commerce and of computer-based government services prompted 
the turn to ODR,108 offered sometimes through ad hoc arrangements 
and increasingly institutionalized. Promotion of this format comes 
from private entities aiming to expand their markets. Some court-
based systems, such as British Columbia, with its new Civil 
Resolution Tribunal, discussed below, are also advocates of ODR. 
That court’s adoption of ODR illustrates how the categorization of 
 
closing of arraignments and misdemeanor courtrooms in certain localities and ad hoc 
exclusions, sometimes based on limited space for observers. Id. at 2191–93. Further, she 
argued that an “audience of locals” was particularly important in that defendants are 
disproportionately from minority communities and under-represented among the 
professional participants in courtrooms. Id. at 2202–05. 
 102. Conferencing by telephone is contemplated as an option for scheduling 
conferences. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. 
 103. See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for 
Mediation, 80 VA. L. REV. 323, 323–27 (1994). 
 104. See Dustin B. Benham, Proportionality, Pretrial Confidentiality, and Discovery 
Sharing, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2189–92 (2014). Benham surveyed the use of 
“return-or-destroy” provisions required as a predicate either to discovery or to settlement, 
and the relaxed standard for granting protective orders of disclosures made. Id. 
 105. See Daniel Hemel, How Nondisclosure Agreements Protect Sexual Predators, VOX 
(Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/10/9/16447118/confidentiality-
agreement-weinstein-sexual-harassment-nda [https://perma.cc/55H3-JKT4]. 
 106. See, e.g., SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts, Inc., 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 107. See Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 1, at 2847–48 n.212. 
 108. For an overview of the various forms of ODR, see generally Ayelet Sela, The 
Effect of Online Technologies on Dispute Resolution System Design: Antecedents, Current 
Trends, and Future Directions, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 635 (2017) [hereinafter Sela, 
The Effect of Online Technologies]. 
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ODR as an alternative to courts will become less useful as courts use 
ODR as a form of adjudication. 
The advantages proffered are speed, assistance for 
unrepresented disputants,109 ease of communication and of 
information sharing,110 the potential to generate more cooperative 
behavior, and methods for parties to come to resolutions. For 
example, one technique to identify mutually-agreed upon settlement 
points is through computer-based “blind-bidding systems.”111 
Accomplishing these goals varies with the technological sophistication 
of a particular system.112 Enthusiasm for doing so runs high, as 
reflected in a “vision” statement from senior members of the U.K. 
judiciary committed to enlisting technology to transform civil justice 
into a unified, paper-free system.113 
In the United States, ODR is coming to the fore through 
corporate-based efforts. In what is called a “B2C” or “business-to-
consumer” contract, some companies require using ODR. Providers, 
such as Modria, argue that costs and delays render court-based 
consumer redress “broken,” and that ODR is the useful 
replacement.114 Proponents seek to assuage concerns about repeat-
player advantages by pointing to the need for businesses to have good 
reputations that, in turn, require them to be consumer friendly by 
offering remedies for faulty products or services.115 Rarely discussed is 
 
 109. See Maximilian A. Bulinski & J.J. Prescott, Online Case Resolution Systems: 
Enhancing Access, Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 205, 221 
(2016); Ayelet Sela, Streamlining Justice: How Online Courts Can Resolve the Challenges 
of Pro Se Litigation, 26 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 331, 341 (2016). 
 110. See J.J. Prescott, Improving Access to Justice in State Courts with Platform 
Technology, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1993, 2020–26 (2017). 
 111. See Sela, The Effect of Online Technologies, supra note 108, at 665–67. 
 112. Id. at 649–67. 
 113. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, TRANSFORMING OUR JUSTICE SYSTEM 5 (2016), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/553261/joint
-vision-statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/HS29-HPWP]; see also JOE TOMLINSON, UNIV. OF 
SHEFFIELD, A PRIMER ON THE DIGITISATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS 14–17 
(2017), https://lawandgoodadministration.files.wordpress.com/2017/09/a-primer-on-the-
digitisation-of-administrative-tribunals1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FNW-HEPV]; Dame Hazel 
Genn, Dean, Univ. Coll. of London Faculty of Laws, 2017 Birkenhead Lecture (Oct. 16, 
2017). 
 114. See AMY J. SCHMITZ & COLIN RULE, THE NEW HANDSHAKE: ONLINE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION AND THE FUTURE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 7–8 (2017); see also Amy J. 
Schmitz, Remedy Realities in Business-to-Consumer Contracting, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 
262 (2016) [hereinafter Schmitz, Remedy Realities]; Expanding Access to Justice with 
Online Dispute Resolution, TYLER TECH., https://www.tylertech.com/solutions-
products/modria [https://perma.cc/WJ4W-XQ45]. 
 115. See, e.g., Schmitz, Remedy Realities, supra note 114, at 236–37. 
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the absence of competition in some markets, making “shopping” for 
alternative providers elusive. 
Information about third-party involvement in or access to ODR 
in the United States is sparse. A few online providers have built in 
“jury-like” mechanisms, whereby disputants can submit conflicts and 
panels of similarly situated individuals (such as other customers) can 
provide feedback or resolutions through polling and aggregating 
opinions.116 While companies such as eBay are reported to resolve 
some sixty million disputes a year, in part through software that 
requires no “human intervention,” the underlying data are not 
available for public inspection.117 The “corporation as courthouse” in 
the U.S. system has no mandates to open its doors or its files to third 
parties.118 
While the United States provides an example of largely 
unregulated ODR, the European Union (“EU”) and the court system 
in British Columbia offer models of government-sponsored and 
government-monitored ODR. The EU’s interest in facilitating cross-
border trades has prompted it to focus on cross-border remedies, 
especially for relatively small claims.119 Rule-makers in British 
Columbia likewise describe the need to lower the costs of small 
claims.120 An important distinction for those familiar with ADR in the 
United States is that the EU’s Directives make such procedures 
supplemental. Member States may require the use of ADR, but such 
procedures may not be exclusive or preclusive of court-based 
 
 116. Sela, The Effect of Online Technologies, supra note 108, at 659–61, 674–75. 
 117. COLIN RULE, MODRIA, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: EXPANDING ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE 5 (2015), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/office_president
/colin_rule_programs_to_bridge_the_gap_slides.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2JN-AZNB]. In 
Part IV, I provide some data, based on state mandates for providers to provide 
information on consumer arbitrations. As I detail, those statutes do not require making 
files publicly accessible, nor do they address ODR. 
 118. Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. REG. 547, 554–69, 
578–85 (2016). 
 119. See Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
May 2013 on Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes and Amending 
Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC, 2013 O.J. (L 165) 63, 63 
[hereinafter, EC ADR Consumer Disputes Directive 2013/11] (“Ensuring access to simple, 
efficient, fast and low-cost ways of resolving domestic and cross-border disputes which 
arise from sales or service contracts should benefit consumers and therefore boost their 
confidence in the market. That access should apply to online as well as to offline 
transactions, and is particularly important when consumers shop across borders.”). 
 120. The British Columbia provisions can be found at Rules, CIVIL RESOLUTION 
TRIBUNAL 3, 5 (July 12, 2017), https://civilresolutionbc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/07
/CRT-rules-effective-July-12-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PQF-YN5Q]. 
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redress.121 While seen as an “efficient way of obtaining redress in mass 
harm situations,” the European Commission commends that such 
procedures should “always be available alongside, or as a voluntary 
element of, judicial collective redress.”122 
In 2013, EU regulations called for a web-based “platform” for 
ODR on which disputants could submit complaints.123 The relevant 
directive also required registered ADR providers to be “independent, 
impartial, transparent, effective, fast and fair.”124 The regulations 
called for public databases (protective of personal data) to enable 
monitoring of ODR’s use and functioning through compiling 
consumer complaints and scoreboards that evaluated access and use 
of the online system.125 In 2016, the European Commission launched a 
new “online dispute resolution platform,” to be made available in any 
of the EU’s twenty-three official languages.126 Businesses selling 
 
 121. Member states may make “participation in ADR procedures mandatory, provided 
that such legislation does not prevent the parties from exercising their right of access to 
the judicial system.” EC ADR Consumer Disputes Directive 2013/11, supra note 119, at 
70. Under the law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), national bodies 
interpret this obligation. See, e.g., Case C-75/16, Menini v. Banco Popolare Società 
Cooperativa, 2017 E.C.L.I. 132, ¶¶ 48, 57, 69–71 (Feb. 16, 2017). 
 122. Commission Recommendation 2013/396/EU, on Common Principles for 
Injunctive and Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States 
Concerning Violation of Rights Granted Under Union Law, 2013 O.J. (L 201) 60, 61. 
Whether ODR in Europe will remain a voluntary option is also a question; some critics 
argue that consumers are hurt by the ability of providers to require more expensive forms 
of process to obtain remedies. See Maxime Hanriot, Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) as 
a Solution to Cross Border Consumer Disputes: The Enforcement of Outcomes, 2 MCGILL 
J. DISP. RES. 1, 4 (2016). 
 123. Regulation (EU) 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
May 2013 on Online Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes and Amending 
Regulation (EC) 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC, 2013 O.J. (L 165) 1, 2 [hereinafter 
EU Regulation Online Dispute Resolution Consumer Disputes 524/2013]. 
 124. Id. at 4. 
 125. Id. at 2–3. See Alternative and Online Dispute Resolution (ADR/ODR), 
EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/solving_consumer_disputes/non-
judicial_redress/adr-odr/index_en.htm [https://perma.cc/6WS2-JLSS] [hereinafter EU 
ADR/ODR]. As of 2008, researchers reported that systems in place for consumer ADR in 
Europe responded to about half a million claims annually, and many of the processes were 
free of charge. See CHRISTOPHER HODGES, IRIS BENÖHR & NAOMI CREUTZFELDT-
BANDA, CONSUMER ADR IN EUROPE 18–20, 368, 380 (2012); see also Maude Piers, 
Europe’s Role in Alternative Dispute Resolution: Off to a Good Start?, 2 J. DISP. RESOL. 
279, 279 (2014). 
 126. EU ADR/ODR, supra note 125; Online Dispute Resolution, EUROPEAN COMM’N 
(2016), https://ec.europa.eu/consumers/odr/main/index.cfm?event=main.home2.show&lng=EN 
[https://perma.cc/3L5S-BMTH]; see also EU Regulation Online Dispute Resolution 
Consumer Disputes 524/2013, supra note 123, at 11. Denmark has been described as at the 
forefront of implementation. See Sylvia Cécile Cavaleri, Digitalizing Dispute Resolution 
Processes: The Example of Denmark, in VI YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION AND ADR (Marianne Roth & Michael Geistlinger eds., forthcoming 2018). 
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goods or services online are required to tell consumers about the 
availability of the system, which is part of a larger “E-justice” 
project.127 The goal is to make ODR more accessible through 
“national platform points” offering cross-border online remedies.128 
 Policing of ODR comes not only through regulations, but also 
from courts. In 2010, in Alassini v. Italian Telecom,129 the Court of 
Justice for the European Union (“CJEU”) concluded that the 
company’s online ADR program was not an impermissible and 
disproportionate burden on rights to a fair hearing, protected by 
European treaties.130 The CJEU’s caveats were that courts in Member 
States had to be able to assess ADR programs’ burdensomeness; 
settlement outcomes could not be binding; the ADR efforts could not 
impose a “substantial delay” in bringing legal proceedings; time-bars 
would need to be tolled; forms of judicial “interim measures” would 
remain available; and settlement procedures could not be available 
only electronically.131 Yet even as the EU system insists on public 
access to information and oversight uncommon in the United States, 
it has not built in opportunities for third parties to watch or to read 
the ODR interactions as they take place. 
The challenges of creating open ODR systems are addressed by 
procedures promulgated by British Columbia,132 which describe the 
efforts to balance public access and personal privacy in light of the 
risks that online information could be manipulated and 
appropriated.133 As noted, the work in British Columbia also 
exemplifies the ways in which ODR is shifting from being an ADR 
process to becoming the court process itself. 
The new “Tribunal Decision Process” is part of British 
Columbia’s Civil Resolution Tribunal (“CRT”), which is to “replace a 
model” of in-person open dispute resolution of property disputes 
(“generally open to the public”) with an ODR process reliant on 
written submissions, as long as parties do not opt out of that 
process.134 The exchanges also aim to encourage negotiation, that, as 
 
 127. See EU ADR/ODR, supra note 125. 
 128. See id.; VĔRA JOUROVÁ, EUROPEAN COMM’N, SETTLING CONSUMER DISPUTES 
ONLINE 1–3 (2016), http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/solving_consumer_disputes/docs/adr-
odr.factsheet_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EVC-XZRT]. 
 129. Case C-317/08, Alassini v. Telecom Italia SpA 2010 E.C.R. I-2213. 
 130. Id. at I-2557. 
 131. Id. at I-2252; see also Case C-75/16, Menini v. Banco Popolare Società 
Cooperativa, 2017 E.C.L.I. 457 ¶ 80. 
 132. See BRITISH COLUMBIA CRT, ACCESS TO RECORDS, supra note 91. 
 133. Id. at 3. 
 134. Id.at 2. 
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the policy governing “Access to Records and Information in CRT 
Disputes” discusses,135 would (if not online) often take place in 
private settings. The policy does not organize access to materials from 
those exchanges. The policy concluded that it would not seek to make 
those exchanges public nor was it “practical to provide the public with 
the opportunity to observe the Tribunal Decision Process as it 
occurs.”136 Instead, the policy created a structure for the public to 
learn about the decisions and achieve “transparency	.	.	. by posting 
CRT final decisions on a publicly accessible website”137 Further, the 
policy permits members public (upon payment of a fee) then to see 
the “evidence submitted.”138 
3.  Arbitration and Confidentiality Mandates 
Turn, then, from resolutions through negotiation in or out of 
court to arbitration, in which a third party renders a decision. As the 
term “court-annexed arbitration” reflects, statutes or court-based 
rules in some jurisdictions send cases to court-appointed arbitrators, 
who are generally lawyers. If unsatisfied, litigants may sometimes 
return to court; the disincentive in some jurisdictions is that if a better 
outcome does not result, fees or costs may be imposed. 
Learning about the public dimensions of court-annexed 
arbitrations requires searching for relevant statutes, looking at local 
court rules, and calling court staff. For example, in the federal courts, 
authorization for court-annexed arbitration came in the 1988 Judicial 
Improvements and Access to Justice Act139 when Congress permitted 
ten federal district courts to mandate it for a limited set of cases 
involving monetary damages under $100,000.140 The statute also 
 
 135. Id. at 3. 
 136. Id. at 2. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. To summarize, the negotiation and mediation phases are distinct from the 
Tribunal Decision Process, which is the phase where information may be provided 
publicly. See Information Access & Privacy Policy, CIVIL RESOLUTION TRIBUNAL, 
https://civilresolutionbc.ca/resources/information-access-privacy-policy/#will-the-crt-share-my-
information-with-the-public [https://perma.cc/3UYP-CRKZ]. 
 139. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 101, 102 
Stat. 4642, 4644 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–658 (2012)) (creating 
committee to “examine problems and issues currently facing the courts of the United 
States” and to “develop a long-range plan for the future of the Federal judiciary”). 
 140. Id. § 652, 102 Stat. at 4659. Note that the 1998 revision does not include the 
limitation precluding cases that include novel issues. In the 1998 Amendment, as well as 
the original 1988 statute, if the court’s jurisdiction rested on 28 U.S.C. § 1343, which is 
available for cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arbitration is not permitted. See 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, § 654, 112 Stat. 2993, 
2995–96 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 654(a) (2012)). 
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provided for trial de novo, with assessment of fees for arbitration if 
the outcome at trial was less favorable than had been achieved in 
arbitration.141 
The 1988 provisions neither addressed the role of the public at 
such proceedings nor spoke in general about confidentiality. The 
statute stated that awards were not to be “made known” to judges 
assigned to the cases, so as to insulate them from being affected by 
that information if litigation resumed.142 Further, the materials 
adduced during arbitration and the awards made were not to be 
admitted as evidence if a trial took place subsequent to the 
arbitration.143 
A decade later, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 
required that all federal district courts “authorize, by local rule	.	.	. , 
the use of alternative dispute resolution processes in all civil actions,” 
including the “use of arbitration.”144 Congress specified court 
authority to appoint additional personnel (“neutrals and 
arbitrators”)145 and called for the Federal Judicial Center (“FJC”) and 
the AO to “assist the district courts in the establishment and 
improvement” of programs.146 That statute also described arbitrators 
as “performing quasi-judicial functions” and, therefore, both subject 
to the rules of disqualification applicable to federal judges and 
protected by doctrines of immunity from suit developed for judges.147 
As for third-party access, Congress imposed a general 
admonition that district courts protect the “confidentiality of the 
 
 141. In the 1988 provisions, Congress had provided that if a party did less well in the de 
novo trial, fee-shifting was permissible. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice 
Act, § 655(a), 102 Stat. at 4661. 
 142. Id. § 654(b), 102 Stat. at 4661 (“Sealing of Arbitration Award”). 
 143. Id. § 655(c), 102 Stat. at 4661 (“Limitation on Admission of Evidence”). This 
constraint adds arbitration proceedings to the limits imposed by federal evidentiary rules 
that have, since 1975, precluded admission of information obtained in a mediation or 
settlement conference for the purpose of proving or disproving “the validity or amount of 
a disputed claim.” FED. R. EVID. 408(a). 
 144. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, § 651(b), 112 Stat. at 2993–94. The 
Act explained that its provisions were not to affect existing programs under the 1988 
statute. Id. § 654(d), 112 Stat. at 2996. Those provisions altered somewhat the category of 
cases eligible for arbitration. See 28 U.S.C. §654(a) (2012) (authorizing referrals of “any 
civil action (including any adversary proceeding in bankruptcy) pending before it when the 
parties consent, except” actions based on “an alleged violation of a right secured by the 
Constitution of the United States,” or when jurisdiction is based “in whole or in part on 
section 1343 of this title,” or when the relief sought in monetary damages exceeds 
$150,000). 
 145. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, § 651(a), 112 Stat. at 2993. 
 146. Id. § 651(f), 112 Stat. at 2994. 
 147. Id. § 655(c), 112 Stat. at 2996. 
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alternative dispute resolution processes” through prohibitions on 
“disclosure of confidential dispute resolution communications.”148 
The statute does not address whether arbitration proceedings 
constitute “confidential dispute resolution communications.”149 In 
practice, few of the ninety-four federal district courts use court-
annexed arbitration,150 and as of 2011, the national tally counted 
fewer than 3,000 cases in such programs.151 Three districts referred 
more than a hundred cases annually, and others referred none.152 
What about public access? Because local rules generally do not 
address this question, district-by-district inquiries were required. As 
of 2014, in the eight districts that had some court-annexed arbitration, 
five treated such proceedings as private; three, including two districts 
reporting a few hundred court-annexed arbitrations, permitted the 
public to attend.153 In short, doctrines and structures of openness can 
be found in some federal court-annexed arbitration programs.154 
The same can be said for state-based court-annexed arbitration. 
Illinois provides an example, as it has a relatively large volume of 
cases involved in its program. In 2011, Illinois courts sent more than 
41,000 cases to a “mandatory, non-binding, non-court procedure 
 
 148. Id. § 652(d), 112 Stat. at 2995 (“Confidentiality Provisions”). Congress called on 
districts to adopt local rules implementing confidentiality and, in the interim, provided this 
provision.  
 149. Very little case law cites to the statute. One decision in 2007 that did is Stepp v. 
NCR Corp., 494 F. Supp. 2d 826, 836–37 (S.D. Ohio 2007). There, an employee had lost a 
job and alleged age discrimination, and the employer sought confidential compulsory 
arbitration outside of the courts. Id. at 828. The district court rejected the claim that 
closure failed to vindicate his statutory rights by citing not only the case law on the Federal 
Arbitration Act, but also 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (1948), which the court read as providing 
“confidentiality in court mandated arbitration.” Id. at 837 (citing Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991)). 
 150. See Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts, supra note 1, at 1657–68. 
 151. According to a survey by FJC researcher Donna J. Stienstra, 2799 cases had been 
referred to arbitration in her review of forty-nine federal district courts in one year, ending 
June 30, 2011; the District of New Jersey recorded 1668 court-annexed arbitrations, and 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania listed 826 court-annexed arbitrations. See DONNA 
STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ADR IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: AN INITIAL 
REPORT 15, app. 17, 23–24 (2011), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012
/ADR2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/NS2J-WRSF]. 
 152. The districts with more frequent use were the District of New Jersey, Eastern 
District of New York, and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; in others where formal 
programs remained, almost none took place. See Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in 
Courts, supra note 1, at 1661 n.133. 
 153. Id. at 1661–62, 1662 nn.134–35. 
 154. Those proceedings were in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See id. at 1661 
n.133. 
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designed to resolve civil disputes by utilizing a neutral third party.”155 
When creating the program, the state’s legislature required 
evaluations of its “effectiveness” to be reported annually.156 
According to staff at the state’s clerk’s office, the arbitrations are held 
in courthouses or other buildings, and the proceedings are open to the 
public.157 Outcomes become part of a court-created database.158 
These open practices are not idiosyncratic innovations. Public 
access to arbitrations is part of a long tradition, reflected in 
documents on English arbitrations dating from pre-Roman Britannia 
through the Elizabethan Age, that gave third-party arbitrators 
authority to resolve disputes and included public access to many 
proceedings.159 So too did arbitrations in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries in the United States. Historians have identified 
examples of arbitrations conducted like trials, albeit without juries, 
and many proceedings included spectators.160 Moreover, twentieth-
 
 155. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE ILL. COURTS, COURT-ANNEXED MANDATORY 
ARBITRATION 1 (2011), http://www.state.il.us/court/Administrative/ManArb/2011
/ManArbRpt11.pdf [http://perma.cc/9FDM-BK9H]. Illinois’s mandatory arbitration is akin 
to abbreviated trials. As of 2011, 41,302 cases were referred to arbitration, about three-
quarters were settled or dismissed prior to arbitration, and about 600 of those that did 
arbitrate proceeded from arbitration to trial. See id. at 5. 
 156. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1008A (West 2011), repealed by Act of August 24, 
2012, Pub. Act No. 97-1099, § 10, 2012 Ill. Laws 5652. Separate reporting is no longer 
required; data on the number of arbitrations have become part of the annual reports. See 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE ILL. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS: 
STATISTICAL SUMMARY 101 (2015), http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/SupremeCourt
/AnnualReport/2015/2015_Statistical_Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/RWF3-8B9J]; Telephone 
Interview with Staff, Admin. Office of the Ill. Courts (Nov. 24, 2014). 
 157. See Arbitrator’s Bench Book, DU PAGE CTY., ILL., EIGHTEENTH JUD. CIR. 14 (3d 
rev. 2011), http://www.dupageco.org/Courts/Docs/34145 [https://perma.cc/QU4J-7KWD]. 
In October of 2017, I reconfirmed with staff at the Administrative Office of the Illinois 
Courts that arbitrations are open to the public. Telephone Interview with Staff, Admin. 
Office of the Ill. Courts (Oct. 2017). 
 158. Posted reports from 2004 to 2011 can be found on the Illinois courts’ websites. See 
Court-Annexed Mandatory Arbitration Annual Reports, ILL. COURTS, 
http://www.state.il.us/court/Administrative/ManArb/default.asp [http://perma.cc/L984-
J7VJ]. The numbers reported in the 2015 calendar year report were that 26,880 cases were 
referred or pending and that 4,527 arbitration hearings were held, with 326 cases 
thereafter proceeding to trial. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE ILL. COURTS, supra note 156, at 
101. 
 159. See DEREK ROEBUCK, EARLY ENGLISH ARBITRATION 226–30 (2008); DEREK 
ROEBUCK, THE GOLDEN AGE OF ARBITRATION: DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER 
ELIZABETH I, at 116, 142 (2015). 
 160. Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the 
American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 468 (1984); AMALIA KESSLER, INVENTING 
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGAL 
REGIME, 1800-1877, at 191–92 (2017); James Oldham & Su Jin Kim, Arbitration in 
America: The Early History, 31 LAW & HIST. REV. 241, 246–51 (2013). 
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century labor arbitrations, embedded in collective bargaining 
agreements and committed to social justice ends, were not only 
publicly enabled, but also produced contractual agreements that were 
accessible to the public.161 
Thus, although today’s purveyors of arbitration aim to make 
confidentiality its hallmark, arbitration has a history that includes 
some publicly accessible proceedings. But contemporary legal rules 
and practices have generated structures of privatization that aim to 
make arbitration appear to be “naturally” closed as if, whether 
involving commercial differences between two corporations or 
between consumers and manufacturers, privacy is requisite. Yet, 
when Congress in 1925 enacted what has come to be called the 
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),162 it provided windows into the 
decisions rendered by locating enforcement proceedings in public 
courts. While motions seeking to vacate arbitrations are a small 
fraction of federal court case filings, the statutory structure does not 
shield them from public scrutiny.163 Rather, if seeking to vacate, 
confirm, or modify awards, parties must file information on the 
arbitrations.164 Thus, the FAA itself “appears to presume that 
arbitration materials could become public.”165 
Likewise, the 2000 Uniform Arbitration Act does not propose 
that state statutes include confidentiality mandates. Rather, a 
comment on judicial enforcement of arbitral awards reminds users 
that “[b]ecause of the involvement of important legal rights, a court 
 
 161. See Amalia D. Kessler, The Public Roots of Private Ordering: An Institutional 
Account of the Origins of Modern American Arbitration 9–10 (Aug. 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 162. See Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, § 4, 43 Stat. 883, 883 (1925) 
(codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012)); Resnik, The Contingency of Openness 
in Courts, supra note 1, at 1675–76. 
 163. One analysis of motions filed from 2011 to 2014 identified 294 motions to vacate. 
See Diana Li, Vacatur of Arbitral Awards: An Empirical Study of Access to Federal Court 
Review 18 (May 25, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 164. See 9 U.S.C. § 13 (2012); see also PDV Sweeny, Inc. v. ConocoPhillips Co., No. 
14-cv-5183, 2014 WL 4979316, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2014) (concluding that arbitral 
award actions are “judicial documents” that are presumptively open); Martis v. Dish 
Network, No. 1:13-cv-1106, 2013 WL 6002208, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2013) (same). 
 165. Richard Frankel, State Court Authority Regarding Forced Arbitration After 
Concepcion, in POUND CIVIL JUSTICE INST., FORCED ARBITRATIONS AND THE FATE OF 
THE 7TH AMENDMENT: THE CORE OF AMERICA’S LEGAL SYSTEM AT STAKE? 55, 70 
(2014), http://www.poundinstitute.org/sites/default/files/docs/2014PoundReport2.24.15.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/MFQ9-VQKW]. 
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should review more carefully claims of confidentiality, trade secrets, 
privilege, or other matters protected from disclosure.”166 
The contemporary aura of privacy that shrouds arbitration comes 
in part from the FAA’s history: its purpose was to enable businesses 
to avoid courts.167 The idea was that bespoke contracts could specify 
the terms, including requiring confidentiality. The FAA’s major 
proponents—the American Arbitration Association (“AAA,” 
founded in 1925) and the New York Chamber of Commerce—argued 
the virtues of privacy for commercial actors.168 
Since 1925, the AAA has been a dominant provider of services 
and has helped to shape the presumption of confidentiality. The 
AAA’s lists of arbitrators are not in a public directory.169 Further, in 
its ethics code, the AAA commits the organization and arbitrators 
working at its behest to keep information that they obtain private.170 
 
 166. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 18 cmt. 1 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000). As of 2017, 
the revised uniform law has been adopted by nineteen jurisdictions and introduced in four 
more jurisdictions. See Arbitration Act (2000), UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Arbitration%20Act%20(2000) [http://perma.cc
/X6DW-5HXH]. 
 167. See Joint Hearings Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary on S. 
1005 and H.R. 646, 68th Cong., 11 (1924) (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman, 
Committee on Arbitration, Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York); H.R. REP. 
NO. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924). 
 168. See FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS 
AND ACHIEVEMENTS 10, 26–27 (1948). 
 169. See The AAA National Roster of Arbitrators and Mediators, AM. ARBITRATION 
ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/aaa-panel [http://perma.cc/5A8C-68ZX]. Public access to 
information about AAA arbitrators is available only when seeking to select arbitrators. 
See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, AAA ARBITRATOR SELECT [hereinafter AAA Arbitrator 
Select], https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/AAA_Arbitrator_Select
_2pg.pdf [http://perma.cc/FL9H-33US] (explaining how, after a party “completes a 
detailed filing form . . . [t]he AAA provides a list of arbitrators whose credentials best 
match the criteria specified” by a party on a detailed filing form). A party choosing the 
“list only” service fills out a two-page form in which the party can indicate the dollar 
amounts of the claim and counterclaim if any; the nature of the dispute; and the “desired 
qualifications for arbitrator(s).” AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, REQUEST FOR ARBITRATOR 
SELECT: LIST ONLY, https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Request%20for%20Arbitrator
%20Select%20List%20only.pdf [http://perma.cc/E293-3A64]. 
  The AAA then provides lists of sets of arbitrators and their fees (ranging from 
$750, $1,500 to $2,000). AAA Arbitrator Select, supra. Searching and selection comes with 
a service charge of $500 for each arbitrator appointed. Id. In addition, state laws seeking 
information on arbitration providers offer another route to information, as do some 
federal regulations. See infra notes 229–49 and accompanying text. Those entities in 
compliance provide spreadsheets on which the names of arbitrators can be found. See, e.g., 
Consumer Arbitration Statistics, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N (2015), https://www.adr.org
/sites/default/files/document_repository/ConsumerReportQ3_2017.xlsx 
[https://perma.cc/RK3L-D46V]. 
 170. Arbitrators working under the AAA adhere to its code of ethics. For example, the 
Commercial Disputes Ethics Code provides: the “arbitrator should keep confidential all 
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Watching the process is not, under current rules, an option, but, in 
recent years, the AAA has published (through LexisNexis and 
Westlaw) redacted versions of some decisions, which are termed 
“awards.”171 Other major domestic arbitration providers advertise 
confidentiality as a signature of their processes. Their hearings are 
generally closed, and their rules permit arbitrators to bar third parties 
from attending hearings.172 
But a distinction needs to be drawn between what information 
arbitrators and institutional providers can (or should) disclose and 
what parties can say about what happened to them. In the context of 
arbitrations imposed on consumers and employees by the providers of 
goods, services, and jobs,173 some repeat players have unilaterally 
sought to insist on secrecy.174 
 
matters relating to the arbitration proceedings and decision.” AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 7 (2004), 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Commercial_Code_of_Ethics_for
_Arbitrators_2010_10_14.pdf [https://perma.cc/TD5U-RLNT]; see also AAA Statement of 
Ethical Principles, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/
StatementofEthicalPrinciples [https://perma.cc/RZZ8-BYYA]. 
 171. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL: 
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF THE NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE 27–28 (1998) [hereinafter AAA Consumer Due Process], https://www.adr.org
/sites/default/files/document_repository/Consumer%20Due%20Process%20Protocol%20(1).pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NG35-LX4B] (“Unlike court proceedings, however, the general public 
has not right to attend arbitration proceedings; if the parties agree, moreover, attendance 
at hearings may be severely restricted.”). For publication, see, for example, Search of 
Arbitral Awards Database, LEXIS ADVANCE, https://advance.lexis.com (type “AAA 
Employment Arbitration Awards” or “AAA Labor Arbitration Awards” into search bar 
to access those collections); see also AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER 
ARBITRATION RULES 28 (2016) [hereinafter AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules], 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Consumer%20Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZXD5-
J8Q5] (“The AAA may choose to publish an award rendered under these Rules; however, 
the names of the parties and witnesses will be removed from awards that are published, 
unless a party agrees in writing to have its name included in the award.). 
 172. JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION 
& MGMT. SERVS. (July 1, 2014), http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration
/#Rule%2026 [http://perma.cc/45KY-C2PZ] (limiting public access to proceedings before 
the Judicial Arbitration and Management Services); Rules of Conditionally Binding 
Arbitration, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, https://www.bbb.org/bbb-dispute-handling-and-
resolution/dispute-resolution-rules-and-brochures/rules-of-conditionally-binding-arbitration/ 
[http://perma.cc/E7TW-KHE7] (“It is our policy that records of the dispute resolution 
process are private and confidential.”). 
 173. See Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 1, at 2872–73; Erin O’Hara O’Connor, 
Protecting Consumer Data Privacy with Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 711, 713–14, 730–31 
(2018); Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679, 
703–07 (2018). 
 174. See Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 1, at 2895. The use of such clauses is 
also the subject of Christopher R. Drahozal, Confidentiality in Consumer and Employment 
Arbitration, 7 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 28, 42–47 (2015). 
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Before turning to the legality of such rules, the question to be 
asked is why they exist. The model arbitration for the FAA was a 
business-to-business transaction, in which the argument for 
confidentiality rested on ideas that the participants were both repeat 
players and that public conflicts would make future dealings more 
difficult or costly. But when a repeat player is in conflict with a one-
shot actor (for example, when a wireless service provider is 
challenged on billing by a customer), the only privacy interest is a 
provider’s desire not to have other similarly-situated consumers know 
of the harms alleged, the positions taken, or the remedies accorded. 
That one-sidedness prompted some courts to reject enforcement 
of confidentiality clauses and, at times, of the arbitration mandates in 
which they were embedded.175 But more recent case law, while 
acknowledging that repeat players gain asymmetrical knowledge, 
condones such practices, sometimes by noting (without any data) that 
the advantages derived are not so significant as to bar their use. 
An example of a secrecy provision comes from a clause imposed 
in 2002 (and since withdrawn) by AT&T instructing that: “Neither 
you nor [the company] may disclose the existence, content or results 
of any arbitration or award, except as may be required by law or to 
confirm and enforce an award.”176 In 2003, the Ninth Circuit held that 
text unconscionable because, while “facially neutral, confidentiality 
provisions usually favor companies over individuals,” AT&T could 
ensure that “none of its potential opponents have access to 
precedent” that AT&T had.177 In contrast, other circuits did not find 
 
 175. Examples of rulings that arbitration clauses remain enforceable even with 
confidentiality requirements and that question of the enforceability of confidentiality itself 
goes at least initially to arbitrators include Borgarding v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. CV 
16-2485 (RAOx), 2016 WL 8904413, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2016) (citing Kilgore v. 
KeyBank, 718 F.3d 1052, 1059 n.9 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)) and Velazquez v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., No. 13CV680-WQH-DHB, 2013 WL 4525581, at *5–6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 
2013) (citing Kilgore v. KeyBank, 718 F.3d 1052, 1059 n.9 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)). 
 176. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151 n.16 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 177. Id. at 1151–52. The Ninth Circuit in Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc., 601 F.3d 987 (9th 
Cir. 2010), found unenforceable ADR provisions, including those requiring 
confidentiality, where they created one-sided advantages; “while handicapping the 
Plaintiffs’ ability to investigate their claims and engage in meaningful discovery, the 
confidentiality provision does nothing to prevent [the defendant] from using its continuous 
involvement in the [dispute resolution] process to accumulate a ‘wealth of knowledge’ on 
how to arbitrate future claims.” Id. at 1002 (quoting Ting, 319 F.3d at 1152); see also 
Narayan v. Ritz-Carlton Dev. Co., 400 P.3d 544, 555 (Haw. 2017); Schnuerle v. Insight 
Commc’ns Co., 376 S.W.3d 561, 578–79 (Ky. 2012); McKee v. AT&T, 191 P.3d 845, 858–59 
(Wash. 2008); Zuver v. Airtouch Commc’ns, Inc., 103 P.3d 753, 764–65 (Wash. 2004). 
Ninth Circuit case law was modified by the ruling in Kilgore v. KeyBank, 718 F.3d 1052 
(9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). The decision concluded that the existence of a confidentiality 
clause in itself was not a sufficient basis for avoiding the obligation to arbitrate. Id. at 1058. 
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such provisions objectionable.178 Some of those decisions posited that 
arbitration was itself ordinarily private. As one court wrote, 
“confidentiality clauses are so common in the arbitration context” 
that court-imposed limits on confidentiality would undermine the 
“character of arbitration itself.”179 
In 2017, the Ninth Circuit returned to the question, prompted in 
part by shifts in California law, and the Circuit tempered its prior 
constraints. Under the law as currently explained by a lower court, 
“the risk of repeat-player advantage does not render unenforceable 
an arbitration agreement containing a confidentiality clause.”180 
Required, however, is that confidentiality provisions include an 
“exception” that permitted parties (at least in theory) to negotiate 
about confidentiality.181 
How common are confidentiality clauses in arbitration 
mandates? A 2015 study by the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (“CFPB”) examined samples of arbitration provisions in 
credit-card documents issued from 2010 to 2012. The CFPB found 
that some credit card markets (such as student loans) imposed 
 
The ruling generally shifted decision-making power on the validity of confidentiality 
clauses from courts to arbitrators. Id. at 1059 n.9. The ability of states to use doctrines of 
unconscionable contracts to limit confidentiality remains, but is constrained by Supreme 
Court case law closely examining the basis for denying enforcement of arbitration 
obligations to determine whether the state courts have failed to follow its edicts on the 
scope of the FAA. See Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426 
(2017); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013). 
 178. See Guyden v. Aetna Inc., 544 F.3d 376, 384–85 (2d Cir. 2008); Iberia Credit 
Bureau Inc. v. Cingular Wireless, 379 F.3d 159, 175–76 (5th Cir. 2004); Parilla v. IAP 
Worldwide Serv., VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 279–81 (3d Cir. 2004); see also African Methodist 
Episcopal Church, Inc. v. Smith, 217 So. 3d 816, 825–26 (Ala. 2016). A court concluded 
that a for-profit educational service could seek an injunction against former students to 
prevent them from disclosing the outcomes of arbitration. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Arce, 
533 F.3d 342, 348–49 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 179. Guyden, 544 F.3d at 385 (quoting Iberia Credit Bureau, 379 F.3d at 175). 
 180. Herrera v. CarMax Auto Superstores Cal., LLC, No. CV–14–776–MWF (VBKx), 
2014 WL 3398363, at *10 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2014) (citing Sanchez v. CarMax Auto 
Superstores California, LLC, 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 473, 481–82 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014)). 
 181. See Poublon v. C.H. Robinson Co., 846 F.3d 1251, 1266 (9th. Cir. 2017) (citing 
Sanchez v. CarMax Auto Superstores California, LLC, 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 473, 481–82 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2014)). A district court thereafter drew a distinction between clauses that had 
such exceptions and those that did not; the court held that a confidentiality clause by a 
national insurance plan that did not include options for its opponents was unenforceable. 
Fox v. Vision Serv. Plan, No. 2:16-cv-2456, 2017 WL 735735, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 
2017). As the judge explained, the insurer could “discipline doctors across the country” 
but with the confidentiality provision, doctors would have no “access to any information” 
about the treatment of other doctors using the same dispute resolution process. Id. In 
contrast, the repeat player participated in all disputes and therefore had “access to 
information and precedents set in other hearing.” Id. 
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confidentiality more frequently than did wireless service providers, 
which, during the time of the study, did not have such clauses.182 
Yet many people (lawyers included) have come to assume that 
they cannot disclose outcomes because they think arbitrations are 
confidential. Institutional providers such as the AAA do not 
discourage such impressions. Rather, the “AAA takes no position on 
whether parties should or should not agree to keep the proceeding 
and award confidential between themselves.”183 
I have focused on the lower courts and not on doctrine from the 
U.S. Supreme Court because it has not directly addressed 
asymmetrical confidentiality mandates. But in the context of 
discussing bans on class actions in arbitration,184 justices have 
mentioned confidentiality as a desired attribute of arbitration that 
could be undermined if class actions were permitted. The topic 
emerged after the Court noted the potential for class arbitrations and 
the AAA had promulgated rules to govern such proceedings. Those 
rules commented that “[t]he presumption of privacy and 
confidentiality” did not apply.185 In 2010, Justice Alito quoted that 
provision as illustrative of the “fundamental changes” that class 
arbitrations would impose on the proceedings.186 Likewise, Justice 
Scalia noted in 2011 in his majority decision in AT&T Mobility LLC 
v. Concepcion187 that confidentiality “becomes more difficult” with 
class action arbitrations.188 
IV.  REPEAT PLAYERS, COSTS, AND THE IMPACT OF BANNING 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Taking steps to identify oneself as harmed and locating the 
source are requisite to seeking redress; “naming, blaming, and 
 
 182. See CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 15, § 2, at 52. 
 183. AAA Statement of Ethical Principles, supra note 170. 
 184. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011). The 
permissibility of bans on class actions in employment is pending before the Court in the 
2017-2018 term. The question is whether the rights to collective actions under the National 
Labor Relations Act are buffers against bans on class actions. See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 
823 F.3d 1147, 1155–56 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017); Murphy Oil 
USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d. 1013, 1019–20 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 
(2017); see also Convergys Corp. v. NLRB, 866 F.3d 635, 637–39 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 185. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 
9(a) (2003), http://apps.americanbar.org/labor/lel-annualcle/08/materials/data/papers/018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EE25-VXX8]. 
 186. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686 (2010). 
 187. 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 188. Id. at 348. 
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claiming” are difficult for individuals to do.189 Joining others makes it 
easier to proceed. Class and other forms of collective actions provide 
infusions of knowledge and resources, typically by way of lawyers.190 
The legitimacy of the resolution of such representative actions hinges 
on the formation of at least a nominal relationship among 
representatives, courts, and absentees. Since 1966, in federal class 
actions where damages are sought, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure have insisted that notice be provided at certification of the 
pendency of the claim.191 Although people often do not respond to 
such notices,192 that mechanism forces the fact of a claim into public 
view.193 
This form of publicity is on the wane because of class action bans 
in courts and in arbitration. The argument advanced in favor of the 
preclusion of group-based claims is that individual arbitration 
provides an “effective” alternative.194 As the lawyer for the Chamber 
of Commerce, which opposed efforts in 2016 by the CFPB to limit 
class action bans, put it: arbitration “empowers individuals, freeing 
them from reliance on lawyers” and makes “dispute resolution easy 
to access and claims easy to prosecute.”195 But, as my opening 
discussion forecasts and as I detail below, the evidence available 
points in the opposite direction: individual consumers do not use 
arbitration. 
 
 189. Austin Sarat, Exploring the Hidden Domains of Civil Justice: "Naming, Blaming, 
and Claiming" in Popular Culture, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 425, 426–27 (2000). 
 190. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the 
Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 685–87, 714–17 (1940). 
 191. See Resnik, “Vital” State Interests, supra note 11, at 1790. 
 192. See, e.g., Nicholas M. Pace & William B. Rubenstein, How Transparent Are Class 
Action Outcomes? Empirical Research on the Availability of Class Action Claims Data 7 
(RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, Working Paper No. WR-599-ICJ, 2008), 
http://www.billrubenstein.com/Downloads/RAND%20Working%20Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc
/JX9W-EYQ9]. 
 193. Rules for class arbitrations have been modeled after court class action rules, and 
therefore, as Justice Scalia correctly observed in AT&T v. Concepcion, class actions—in 
court or arbitration—make confidentiality “more difficult.” 563 U.S. at 348. 
 194. In the 1980s, as the U.S. Supreme Court expanded its interpretation of the reach 
of the FAA, the Court launched the argument that arbitration was an “effective” means of 
vindicating federal statutory rights in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). That decision was when the Court first applied the FAA to 
preclude litigation of a federal statutory right. Id. at 637–38. For discussion of the 
“adequacy” test’s application, evolution, and its limits, see Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, 
supra note 1, at 2884–90. 
 195. Examining the CFPB’s Proposed Rulemaking on Arbitration: Is it in the Public 
Interest and for the Protection of Consumers?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. 
& Consumer Credit of the House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. 4 (2016) (Statement 
of Andrew Pincus, Partner, Mayer Brown LLP). 
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A. The Rarity of Single-File Consumer Claims 
To learn about evidence of “empowerment” through consumer 
arbitration practices, the CFPB surveyed a three-year period in six 
financial services markets involving tens of millions of customers.196 
That research demonstrated that individuals infrequently bring claims 
in arbitration; the CFPB located about 400 filings brought by 
consumers in each of the three years studied.197 
Another source of data comes from a few states that statutorily 
require consumer-ADR providers to publish information on use.198 
California’s statute, enacted in 2002 and amended in 2014, calls for 
providers of arbitrations to make available information in “a 
computer-searchable format” on the web.199 The information required 
to be publicized under this law includes “each consumer arbitration” 
 
 196. See CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 15, at § 1.4.1, 9, § 1.4.3, 11. 
 197. The six markets were “credit card; checking account/debit cards; payday loans; 
prepaid cards; private student loans; and auto loans.” Id. at § 1.4.3, 11. 
 198. Lexis and Westlaw also allow subscribers to search the texts of arbitral awards 
provided by the AAA with some redactions. See, e.g., Search of Arbitral Awards Database, 
LEXIS ADVANCE, https://advance.lexis.com (type “AAA Employment Arbitration 
Awards” or “AAA Labor Arbitration Awards” into search bar to access those 
collections). 
 199. Act of Sept. 30, 2002, ch. 1158, sec. 1, § 1281.96(a), 2002 Cal. Stat. 7502, 7502 
(codified as amended at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a) (West, Westlaw through 
2017 Reg. Sess.)); Act of Sept. 30, 2014, ch. 870, sec. 1, § 1281.96(a), 2014 Cal. Stat. 5671, 
5671 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a), (b) (West, Westlaw 
through 2017 Reg. Sess.)) (originally enacted in 2002, effective 2003, and amended in 
2014). Given that I gathered information initially for AAA filings in 2009–2013 and that its 
reporting was governed by the mandates of California’s 2003 statute, the quoted 
provisions in the text are from the 2003 version of the statute. 
  The 2014 statute made a few modifications. California required that “[t]he 
information required by this section shall be made available in a format that allows the 
public to search and sort the information using readily available software.” Act of Sept. 30, 
2014, ch. 870, sec. 1, § 1281.96(b), 2014 Cal. Stat. at 5672. Furthermore, the 2014 statute 
mandated that data are to be “directly accessible from a conspicuously displayed link.” Id. 
The statute—in 2003 and in 2014—also requires that paper copies be provided upon 
request, exempts companies doing fewer than fifty yearly consumer arbitrations from web-
based quarterly reporting and protects companies from liability for providing the 
information. See Cal. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a), (c)(2), (e); Act of Sept. 30, 2014, ch. 
1158, sec. 1, §1281.96(a), (c)(2), (3), 2014 Cal. Stat. at 5671–5672; Act of Sept. 30, 2002, ch. 
1158, sec. 1, § 1281.96(b)(1)–(2), (d) 2002 Cal. Stat. at 7502–03. The 2014 amendment 
added additional disclosure requirements, including whether “arbitration was demanded 
pursuant to a pre-dispute arbitration clause and, if so, whether the pre-dispute arbitration 
clause designated the administering arbitration company.” Act of Sept. 30, 2014, ch. 870, 
sec. 1, § 1281.96(a)(1), 2014 Cal. Stat. at 5671. 
  Maryland, Maine, and the District of Columbia enacted similar provisions after 
California’s 2002 enactments. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4430 (West, Westlaw through 
Dec. 12, 2017); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394 (West, Westlaw through 2017 First 
Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. 
Sess.). 
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(including the name of non-consumer parties who are corporations or 
other business entities); the “type of dispute” (by wage brackets for 
employees); whether an attorney represented the consumer; the time 
from when a demand to arbitrate was made until disposition; the 
mode of disposition (“withdrawal, abandonment, settlement, award 
after hearing, award without hearing, default, or dismissal without 
hearing”); the prevailing party; the amount sought; the amount 
awarded and other relief provided; and the arbitrator’s name, fee, and 
the fee’s allocation among the parties.200 
Not all providers comply with California’s mandate. According 
to a 2013 study, Reporting Consumer Arbitration Data in California, 
eleven of the twenty-six entities identified as arbitration providers 
filed some––but not all––of the required information.201 A 2017 
follow-up reported that thirty-two entities offered consumer 
arbitration services, eleven (about one-third) posted some data, and 
three met all the formal requirements of California’s law202 One of 
those providers largely in compliance was the American Arbitration 
Association, which puts “Consumer Arbitration Statistics” on its 
webpage and states that the data are “updated on a quarterly basis, as 
required by law.”203 The AAA is also the designated dispute 
resolution provider for AT&T.204 Because I wanted to learn about 
how much consumers used single-file arbitration, I focused on AT&T, 
which had succeeded in the Supreme Court when arguing that its ban 
on collective actions was enforceable under the FAA. Working with 
 
 200. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a) (Westlaw). 
 201. DAVID J. JUNG, JAMIE HOROWITZ, JOSE HERRERA & LEE ROSENBERG, PUB. 
LAW RESEARCH INST., REPORTING CONSUMER ARBITRATION DATA IN CALIFORNIA: 
AN ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE WITH CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
§ 1281.96, at 9–12, 52–53 (2013), http://gov.uchastings.edu/docs/arbitration-report/2014-
arbitration-update [http://perma.cc/9M5X-8LH2]. The remaining fifteen companies did 
not publish any disclosure report on their websites. Id. at 10. 
 202. PUB. LAW RESEARCH INST., U.C. HASTINGS COLL. OF THE LAW, ARBITRATION 
REPORTING IN CALIFORNIA: COMPLIANCE WITH CCP §1281.96, at 4 (2017), 
http://carsfoundation.org/pdf/arbitration_UC-Hastings-report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc
/W8CB-TAVY]. Those three were ADR Services, Arts Arbitration and Mediation 
Services (“AAMS”), and JAMS. Id. at 6. 
 203. Consumer and Employment Arbitration Statistics, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
https://www.adr.org/ConsumerArbitrationStatistics [https://perma.cc/JC67-SUMZ] 
[hereinafter AAA Consumer Arbitration Statistics]. The 2017 Hastings Report described 
the AAA as a “good,” in that it complied with much of the substance of the California 
requirements in 2017, but that study did not list the AAA as one of the top three 
compliant providers because the AAA’s website did not use some of the statutory 
language, which makes web-based searches more difficult. See PUB. LAW RESEARCH 
INST., supra note 202, at 24. 
 204. See Resolve a Dispute with AT&T via Arbitration, AT&T, https://www.att.com
/esupport/article.html#!/wireless/KM1045585 [https://perma.cc/2PXP-XE8R].  
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adept and thoughtful research assistants, we culled the data that 
AAA posted on its website to learn about claims brought against or 
by AT&T. 
 Before detailing the results, caveats are in order. A first 
limitation is the absence of access to the underlying materials, which 
are held privately. As the AAA explains, it does not independently 
verify what arbitrators report to it.205 A second problem is that coding 
errors can occur at both individual and aggregate levels. For example, 
when researching consumer arbitration between 2015 and 2016, we 
identified sixty-two cases in the set that were described as seeking the 
same amount ($607,525.40) and in which each consumer was listed as 
having received the same award ($585.71). AAA research staff 
responded to our inquiries, identified a computer coding error 
affecting these cases as well as other cases, and posted corrected data. 
But no red flags told other researchers that the data had been 
corrected.206 While a vivid example of a potential error may be found 
through culling thousands of entries and then seeking clarification, 
the general public has no systematic method of checking the accuracy 
of the data posted by AAA. 
Of course, researchers on court-based information know well 
that such data are neither pristine nor comprehensive. For example, 
lawyers in the federal system fill out civil cover sheets that require the 
selection of a single cause of action for each case filed.207 Yet those of 
us who write complaints regularly plead more than one legal basis on 
which to proceed. Further, searching the electronic database to learn 
about rulings at different phases of cases is challenging.208 Moreover, 
in the federal system, access to the electronic system is costly unless 
individuals or organizations fit the categories for lower charges or 
 
 205. See AAA Consumer Arbitration Statistics, supra note 203 (“Any ‘prevailing party’ 
information contained with this website/document, has been provided solely by the 
arbitrator(s) to an arbitration. The AAA has not reviewed, investigated, or evaluated the 
accuracy or completeness of the arbitrator’s/arbitrators’ determination of the ‘prevailing 
party’ and makes no representations regarding the accuracy or completeness of this 
information.”). The AAA has upon occasion opened its own files to researchers. 
 206. Email from Ryan Boyle, Vice President, Statistics & In-House Research, Am. 
Arbitration Ass’n, to Judith Resnik (Sept. 25, 2017) [hereinafter Sept. 2017 Email from 
Ryan Boyle] (on file with author). 
 207. Civil Cover Sheet, JS 44, U.S. COURTS (2017), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/js_044_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9MJ-ZW9E]. 
 208. See ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION 145–48 (2017); Deborah R. 
Hensler, Happy 50th Anniversary, Rule 23! Shouldn’t We Know You Better After All this 
Time?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1620–21 (2017); Miguel de Figueiredo, Alexandra D. 
Lahav & Peter Siegelman, Do Judges Respond to Incentives? The Effects of the Six 
Month List 15–16 (Feb. 20, 2018) (unpublished draft), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2989777 
[https://perma.cc/S2SZ-PT7A]. 
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exemptions. Filings related to administrative adjudication raise yet 
other problems, as no comprehensive database hosts the materials.209 
Nonetheless, because court records are presumptively public, third-
parties have the possibility of looking at the underlying materials. 
 The arbitration statistics reported here have, therefore, to be 
read with an appreciation for the potential for errors and 
incompleteness. Our work with these materials entailed two data 
pulls, one focused on July of 2009 to June of 2014 and a second, on 
information about the period between July of 2014 and June of 2017. 
Using the same methodology, we looked at thousands of AAA-
posted inputs on individual consumer claims, some of which related to 
the same case; we excluded claims related to real estate and 
construction.210 Between July of 2009 and June of 2014, we identified 
a total of 134 claims against AT&T, or an average of 27 per year 
brought by consumers.211 During that same time period, AT&T had 
between 85 and 120 million customers. By 2016, AT&T’s customer 
base had grown to some 147 million.212 The 2014-2017 review 
identified 316 claims against AT&T (or 105 per year) closed in the 
three years ending June of 2017.213 
 
 209. DANIEL J. SHEFFNER, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE 
MATERIALS ON AGENCY WEBSITES, DRAFT REPORT 3–4 (2017), https://www.acus.gov
/sites/default/files/documents/Adjudication%20Materials%20on%20Agency%20Websites%20
%28March%206%2C%202017%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/FW88-VART]. 
 210. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 1, at 2899. For the 2009 through 2014 
period, we looked at the list of 17,368 individual claims (sometimes related to the same 
case). By, as noted, excluding real estate and construction, we identified 7,303 (or forty-
two percent) as in the consumer category. Of the 5,224 claims “terminated by an award,” 
about half included a dollar figure. For the 2014 to 2017 timeframe, and deleting the 
overlap in 2012-2014, we looked at the list of 13,648 individual claims (again sometimes 
related to the same case). Again excluding real estate and construction, we identified 6,477 
(or forty-seven percent) as in the consumer category. 
  Of the 2,545 claims “terminated by an award,” about forty-five percent included a 
dollar figure. A bit more than half of those awards (twenty-four percent) went to 
consumers, and twenty-one percent to companies. 
 211. Id. at 2812. 
 212. See AT&T INC., 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2017), https://investors.att.com/~
/media/Files/A/ATT-IR/financial-reports/annual-reports/2016/att-ar2016-completeannualreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5F24-SYSJ]. 
 213. These data come from two AAA datasets, the first covering complaints closed 
between July 2009 and June 2014 and the second covering complaints closed between July 
2012 and June 2017. We then looked to cases to which AT&T (and any of the variations in 
its name and corporate form) was a party. Overlapping time periods were deleted from 
the second dataset. The caveat is that there were minor differences when information 
overlapped on claims in 2012-2014, and in those instances, we used the earlier posted data. 
Both datasets are on file with the author [hereinafter AAA Data, July 2009-June 2017].  
  The July 2009-June 2017 data, as posted by the AAA and including additional 
quarters posted thereafter, can also be found at Yale Law School Consumer Arbitration 
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 A few details illustrate the kinds of information available and 
the limits of the coded information. In the 316 cases in which AT&T 
was involved between 2014-2017, thirty-nine were described as ending 
in decisions, called “awards,” 251 settled, and twenty-six fell under 
the categories of “administrative,” “dismissed,” or “withdrawn.”214 
Within the thirty-nine “awarded” cases, twenty-two involved 
instances when AT&T “prevailed.” Of those cases, in three, 
consumers were to pay the company in amounts ranging from $566 to 
$2103. In the other seventeen cases that ended in awards, the AAA 
compilation listed “zero” as funds that would be ordered paid; in nine 
instances, the compilation listed no party prevailing. In one case, no 
party was listed as prevailing, but the consumer was described as 
receiving a positive award.215 Counting this case along with the other 
seven claims in which consumers were listed as prevailing, these eight 
consumer awards ranged from $2.23 to $1,449, with a median of 
$525.36.216 
A summary comes by way of bringing the two data sets together 
in Figure 1, Consumer Arbitration Filings with the American 
Arbitration Association. As that Figure shows, during the course of 
eight years, an average of fewer than sixty people a year sought relief 
for claims against AT&T by using the individual arbitration system 
mandated. 
 
Data Archive, Consumer Arbitrations with The American Arbitration Association 2009 to 
Present, OPEN SCI. FRAMEWORK, https://osf.io/qmtsu/ [https://perma.cc/4PYT-79P8]. This 
website has been constructed to enable ongoing preservation of AAA data in light of the 
AAA practice of taking down a quarter of data every time a new quarter is posted given 
that the California statute requires that only five years of data be made public. 
  The data from 2009–2014 did not include a set of 1,148 claims against AT&T filed 
between 2011 and 2012 by one law firm, of which 1,093 were filed on one day. Another 
fifty-three were filed during the preceding fifteen months and two were filed in the 
subsequent month. After discussions with lawyers at that firm, it became clear that its 
filings did not fit the model of individual, single-file cases that both AT&T and the U.S. 
Supreme Court had extolled. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 1, at 2901 n.480. 
  The numbers that we identified comport with information reported by AT&T to 
Senators Al Franken, Richard Blumenthal, Ron Wyden, Patrick Leahy, and Edward J. 
Markey in 2017. Letter from Timothy P. McKone, Exec. Vice President Fed. Relations, 
AT&T Servs., Inc., to Sen. Al Franken, Sen. Richard Blumenthal, Sen. Ron Wyden, Sen. 
Patrick Leahy & Sen. Edward J. Markey, U.S. Senate 6 (June 30, 2017), 
https://www.franken.senate.gov/files/letter/170630ATTResponseLetter.pdf [https://perma.cc
/87JT-J48V] [hereinafter AT&T letter to U.S. Senators] (“412 arbitrations have been 
commenced since the beginning of 2015; most were settled before hearing, just as the vast 
majority of court cases are resolved before trial.”). 
 214. AAA Data, July 2009-June 2017, supra note 213. The focus was on cases closed 
between July 2014 and June 2017. 
 215. Id. These details provide examples of the “noise” in the statistical compilations 
posted on the AAA website. 
 216. Id. 
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 Figure 1 also includes information garnered by the CFPB, 
which relied on AAA-posted data, as we did. The CFPB’s findings 
confirm that a focus on AT&T did not produce an idiosyncratic 
result. Millions upon millions of people have credit cards of varying 
kinds, and about 104 per year seek redress through single-file 
arbitration. In short, almost no one turns to the self-proclaimed 
“effective” method of redress that companies have imposed. 
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Under some arbitration mandates, including AT&T’s, 
individuals could also use small claims courts,217 but again only single-
file.218 As I recounted in Diffusing Disputes, we sought to gather some 
information on filings in small claims courts from 2010 to 2014. To do 
so, we selected two jurisdictions, California and Illinois; in both, 
several counties provided free online information about small claims 
court filings.219 In California, where accessible databases came from 
twenty-five of its fifty-eight counties (just under a third of the state’s 
population), we identified sixty-six cases in fifteen counties in which 
AT&T was listed as a defendant and three in which it was a 
plaintiff.220 During the same five-year period, we located 140 cases in 
fourteen counties in Illinois that involved AT&T in breach of contract 
or fraud cases.221 
More recently, we tried a different approach by looking for 
filings involving AT&T from July of 2009 through June of 2017 in the 
five largest counties in the United States—Los Angeles and San 
Diego counties, California; Maricopa County, Arizona; Cook County, 
Illinois; and Harris County, Texas. In 2016, 27.5 million residents, or 
 
 217. The relevant documents during the 2009-2014 period are discussed in Diffusing 
Disputes, supra note 1, at 2903 n.486. During the 2014-2017 period, AT&T also permitted 
use of small claims court. See Service Agreement, AT&T, https://www.att.com/equipment
/legal/service-agreement.jsp?q_termsKey=postpaidServiceAgreement&q_termsName=Service
+Agreement [https://perma.cc/LB6B-2CXA]; Wireless Customer Agreement, AT&T § 2.1 
(2015), https://www.att.com/legal/terms.wirelessCustomerAgreement.html [https://perma.cc
/9XA6-E956]; see also File a Complaint, AT&T (2017), https://www.att.com/esupport
/article.html#!/wireless/KM1041856 [https://perma.cc/3ZQB-6EMW]. 
 218. The CFPB also sought to understand the role played by small claims courts. The 
CFPB looked at filings in 2012 and found that 870 consumers filed against credit issuers in 
small claims court in a set of jurisdictions totaling about 85 million people; the CFPB 
identified credit card issuers turning to courts repeatedly—eighty percent of 41,000 
claims—for debt collection. CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 15, § 1, at 15–
16, § 7, at 11–12. The CFPB encountered the challenges we had in that a central database 
for small claims courts does not exist, and access to data varies by jurisdictions. Id. § 7, at 
5. Therefore, the CFPB only used information from states with databases that purported 
to provide statewide data, permit searches by party name, and allow for sorting by date. 
Id. § 7, at 5–6. The CFPB supplemented its statewide data with data from the thirty most 
populous counties in the United States. Id. § 7, at 6. 
 219. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 1, at 2903. 
 220. These counties were: Santa Clara, Ventura, Santa Cruz, Fresno, Stanislaus, Placer, 
Kern, El Dorado, Contra Costa, San Joaquin, San Francisco, San Mateo, Monterey, 
Marin, and Mendocino. Memorandum from Diana Li, Jonas Wang, John Giammatteo, 
Marianna Mao, Ben Woodring & Chris Milione on Small Claims Court Filings: A 
Preliminary Analysis, to Judith Resnik 3, 6 (Mar. 16, 2015) (on file with author). 
 221. Those counties were Cook, Lake, St. Clair, Vermilion, Clinton, LaSalle, DuPage, 
Madison, Bard, Champaign, Winnebago, Macon, McHenry, and Jackson. Id. at 7–8. 
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about 8.5% of the U.S. population, lived in these five counties.222 
Between July 2009 and June 2017, by using the tools for online 
searches provided by the counties, we identified 273 small claims 
cases filed against AT&T and 10 filed by AT&T.223 
 
 222. These figures are calculated using the sum of the five counties’ populations in 
2016, divided by the 2016 U.S. census population. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COUNTY 
POPULATION TOTALS DATASETS: 2010–2016, (2017), https://www.census.gov/data
/datasets/2016/demo/popest/counties-total.html [https://perma.cc/6Y2Z-MLGU]; Quick 
Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2017), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US
/PST045216 [https://perma.cc/EM5F-ML22]. 
 223. The caveats are that we relied on using various versions of AT&T’s commonly 
known corporate entities, put them into the text box provided, and sifted through the 
results, and that the methods to do searches in counties were not identical. For example, in 
Cook County, Maricopa County, and San Diego County, we were able to search for the 
broad term “ATT,” and search the results. The search functions in these counties do not 
accept the ampersand symbol. In Los Angeles County, using “AT&T” as a “party” alone 
was too general for the system, and in Harris County, business name searches were 
required to have at least eight characters. In these two counties, we therefore further 
specified AT&T’s corporate entities by using “AT&T Corp.,” “AT&T Inc.,” “AT&T 
Mobility,” “AT&T Communications,” and “AT&T Wireless.” We did not, for example, 
search for all of the terms associated with the Bell Telephone Company. By doing what is 
known as a follow-up sensitivity check after we had completed the searches, we know that 
AT&T’s predecessor companies, “Illinois Bell” or “Southwest Bell,” may also have been 
parties to cases. Thus, because of the search variables and because AT&T has over time 
used different names, it is possible, and we think likely, that our research resulted in an 
undercount of small claims cases. 
  The databases in counties varied in another respect. It was not always clear what 
cases were “small claims” cases, and moreover, what value claims qualify as “small claims” 
also varies by state and over time. To avoid more sources of an undercount, we were over-
inclusive. Thus, while Los Angeles County, Harris County, and San Diego County 
explicitly identified cases as small claims, in Cook County we included all cases involving 
contract disputes, consumer fraud disputes, or pro se litigants; in Maricopa County, we 
included all civil claims. 
  Thereafter, we summed our results for each county during the relevant time 
period. In Cook County, we identified at least 20 cases in which AT&T was the defendant 
and at least 9 in which AT&T was the plaintiff. In Harris County, we identified seven cases 
in which AT&T was the defendant, one in which it was the plaintiff, and one in which they 
were the counter-plaintiff. In Los Angeles County, we identified at least 177 cases in which 
AT&T was the defendant and no cases in which it was the plaintiff. In Maricopa County, 
we located AT&T as the defendant 17 times and not a plaintiff in any case. In San Diego 
County, we found that AT&T was the defendant in at least 52 cases and not a plaintiff in 
any. 
  For more details, see Memorandum from Greg Conyers on AT&T Small Claims 
Data in the Five Largest Counties in United States, to Judith Resnik (Jan. 22, 2017) (on 
file with author). The underlying data are posted on the websites of each of the counties. 
“Party Name Search,” The Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, 
https://www.lacourt.org/paonlineservices/civilindex/cipublicmain.aspx; “Electronic Full 
Case Docket Search,” Clerk of the Circuit Court, Cook County, Illinois, 
http://www.cookcountyclerkofcourt.org/?section=CASEINFOPage&CASEINFOPage=2400; 
“Search For Your Case,” Justice of the Peace Courts, Harris County, Texas, 
https://jpwebsite.harriscountytx.gov/FindMyCase/search.jsp; “Justice Court Case History,” 
Maricopa County Justice Courts, http://justicecourts.maricopa.gov/FindACase/casehistory.aspx; 
96 N.C. L. REV. 605 (2018) 
2018] OPEN COURTS AND ARBITRATIONS 655 
This preliminary foray into trying to compare the use of small 
claims court and arbitration suggests that, like arbitration, small 
claims court filings are a rarity. A few individuals have pursued relief 
in small claims courts against AT&T. As for claims brought by the 
company, they are exceedingly unusual. The company has little 
incentive to pursue small claimants in either arbitration or small-
claims court. In the sample we reviewed, AT&T can be found filing in 
small claims court but not in its own, mandated arbitration system.224 
 Analysts of dispute resolution know well that filings are not the 
best or the only metric of underlying disputes. Claims may not be 
pursued for a host of reasons, as “lumping it” (doing nothing) is a 
common response. Moreover, remedies may be available because 
companies respond to complaints. Low filing rates could therefore 
reflect inertia, that no legal claims are available, or that an opponent 
is conciliatory when challenged.225 But as I detailed in Diffusing 
Disputes,226 the federal and state governments pursued all the major 
wireless service providers for overcharging customers in violation of 
federal law and for failing to respond to customer requests for 
reimbursements.227 These government filings against the wireless 
companies illustrate the importance of collective action (in these 
instances, governments as plaintiffs) to seeking redress. 
That pursuit undermines an analysis that the miniscule number 
of consumer-initiated claims came from a lack of legal bases for 
bringing claims. Rather, the better explanation of what Cynthia 
Estlund called “missing claims” in the employment context228 comes 
 
“Party Name Search,” Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, 
http://courtindex.sdcourt.ca.gov/CISPublic/namesearch. 
 224. As noted, we found ten claims initiated by AT&T in small claims courts. See supra 
text accompanying note 223. We found no claims initiated by AT&T against consumers 
during the 2009-2014 period in the AAA arbitration data, but AT&T did file a 
counterclaim in one of the consumer-initiated claims. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra 
note 1, at 2902. According to the AAA data, AT&T did not initiate any claims in 
arbitration in the subsequent three years. See AAA Data, July 2009-June 2017, supra note 
213. 
 225. That is the view espoused by AT&T, as indicated by its letter to several U.S. 
Senators. AT&T Letter to U.S. Senators, supra note 213, at 6. That letter argued that 
“[m]any thousands of customers have used AT&T’s dispute resolution process to obtain 
prompt, fair resolutions for their claims. The number of reported arbitration decisions is 
small because only a relatively small number of cases are not settled, and actually proceed 
to the arbitration process––and even fewer proceed to a final hearing, because they are 
settled after the arbitration process as invoked.” Id. 
 226. See Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 1, at 2908–2910. 
 227. See id. at 2909; see also Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary 
Judgment at 2–3, FTC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 1:14-CV-3227-HLM (N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 
2014). 
 228. Estlund, supra note 173, at 712–18. 
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from the practical difficulties of reading bills, ferreting out 
overcharges, understanding and using the procedures, and paying 
upfront costs. Moreover, the sums sought to be recouped in individual 
cases are small compared to the energy required to seek relief. The 
arbitration regimes imposed by repeat players on less well-resourced 
litigants not only privatize process through diffusing claims to diverse 
providers but also erase legal claims. Instead of a pathway to justice, 
these obligatory programs have become barriers to publicity and to 
obtaining relief. 
B. Assessing Fees and Providing Waivers 
Arbitration and courts both charge users for services. Below, I 
sketch some of the ways in which the dollars and cents of dispute 
resolution—in both arbitration and courts—also limit access and are 
another method by which public knowledge about disputes is being 
lost. 
In some jurisdictions, information about the costs of court-
annexed arbitration is available to the public. In some programs, 
parties have to pay separately (and sometimes privately) for 
arbitrators; in others, the expenses of support for ADR programs are 
borne by the court, whose personnel may also staff the programs.229 In 
terms of the amounts, some courts regulate the charges of auxiliary 
ADR providers. For example, in the federal system, the lawyers 
serving as court-annexed arbitrators have fees capped at $150 to $250 
per arbitration,230 and those sums are generally paid by the court. 
 
 229. See ILLINOIS COURT ASSESSMENTS 2016, supra note 19, at 10; Telephone 
Interview with Staff, Admin. Office of the Ill. Courts (Oct. 24, 2017). 
 230. The Judicial Conference of the United States authorizes each district to set its 
own rules on paying ADR neutrals. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF 
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 53 (1999) 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/1999-09_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/DE9F-JP88]. In 
the federal courts using court-annexed arbitration, several have written rules calling on the 
“court” or the AO to compensate arbitrators. For example, the District of New Jersey 
provides: “An arbitrator shall be compensated $250 for service in each case assigned for 
arbitration. . . . [F]ees shall be paid by or pursuant to an order of the Director of the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts.” D. N.J. CIV. R. 201.1(c). Similarly, the 
Eastern District of New York provides: “An arbitrator shall be compensated $250 for 
services in each case. . . . [F]ees shall be paid by or pursuant to the order of the Court 
subject to the limits set by the Judicial Conference of the United States.” E.D.N.Y. CIV. R. 
83.7(b). The rule for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is: “The arbitrators shall be 
compensated $150.00 each for services in each case assigned for arbitration. . . . [F]ees 
shall be paid by or pursuant to the order of the director of the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts.” E.D. PA. CIV. R. 53.2(2). The limited fees paid may have an effect 
on the place in which arbitrations are held; convening the proceeding in a lawyer’s office is 
likely time-saving for the arbitrator, even as it makes public access to the proceeding 
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Special assessments are another route to funding. Illinois charges 
each civil litigant eight to ten dollars on top of other fees to cover the 
costs of its court-annexed arbitrators and the program’s 
administration.231 
Learning about the costs of privately-based arbitration is 
difficult. Two sets of fees exist, those charged by the arbitrators and 
those imposed by the entity that administers the arbitration, which 
can include (as the AAA does) fees for obtaining access to lists of 
arbitrators. 
Depending on the arbitration market, fees paid to arbitrators can 
range from a few hundred dollars to tens of thousands of dollars daily. 
For example, the AAA’s Consumer Arbitration Rules provide that 
arbitrators dealing with “a case with an in-person or telephonic 
hearing” are to receive $1,500 per day; the rate for document-only 
arbitrations is $750 per case.232 Information about the charges 
imposed by other providers comes from case law, such as a decision 
finding unenforceable an obligation to arbitrate that was imposed on 
mobile home owners renting land in California.233 The court described 
JAMS, another major provider, as charging a fee of “$5,000 to 
$10,000 fee for each day of arbitration”; half of the sums were—under 
provisions in the rental documents that the court found 
unenforceable, half of the sums were to have been paid in advance by 
the mobile home owners.234 In contrast, if one makes it into court, 
judges are “free” in the sense that their salaries are paid by the 
governments that employ them. 
As for administration fees, in 2013, the AAA instituted a 
consumer filing fee of $200, confirmed again in 2016; business parties 
are charged $1,700.235 The AAA states that, as a condition of its 
services, consumers and employees are not to be charged the fees for 
 
functionally implausible. See Memorandum from Jason Bertoldi on Compensating ADR 
Neutrals in the Federal Courts to Judith Resnik 5 (Mar. 3, 2015) (on file with author). 
 231. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1009A (West, Westlaw through P.A. 100-576 of 
the 2018 Reg. Sess.). 
 232. AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules, supra note 171, at 34. 
 233. Penilla v. Westmont Corp., 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 473, 488 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
 234. Id. at 480, 485.  
 235. AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules, supra note 171, at 33; see also American 
Arbitration Association (AAA) Consumer Dispute Documents Pre-September 2014, AM. ARBITRATION 
ASS’N, https://archive.org/stream/ConsumerRelatedDisputesSupplementaryPROCEDURES
/Consumer-Related%20Disputes%20Supplementary%20PROCEDURES_djvu.txt 
[https://perma.cc/93WJ-F5B7]. If the claim is withdrawn within thirty days of filing, the 
business party received a refund of half its filing fee. Consumer Arbitration Fact Sheet, 
AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://info.adr.org/consumer-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc
/AMC6-UZTZ]. 
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arbitrators; the AAA had capped that requirement at $75,000 and 
thereafter removed the cap.236 Filing fees may, at the option of the 
provider or under the documents mandating use of alternative 
processes, sometimes be recouped at the conclusion of the proceeding 
through fee-shifting.237 
Limits on private-sector ADR charges can come from self-
imposed constraints. For example, the AAA’s Consumer Due Process 
Protocol calls for costs to be “reasonable.”238 Limits can also come 
through lawyers and providers enhancing access through pro bono 
programs239 and by way of regulation either through statutes or 
judicial decisions finding arbitration obligations unenforceable 
because of the fees imposed.240 
One route to capping arbitration expenses could have come from 
interpreting the FAA as licensing the enforcement of obligations to 
arbitrate only if the process was accessible, measured in part in terms 
of fees. But in 2000, in the 5-4 decision of Green Tree Financial Corp. 
v. Randolph,241 the U.S. Supreme Court placed the burden on the 
opponent of arbitration to demonstrate its excessive costs.242 In 2013, 
 
 236. Telephone Interview with Ryan Boyle, Vice President for Statistics & In-House 
Research, Am. Arbitration Ass’n (Jan. 26, 2018). The rules provide that the “business 
shall pay the arbitrator’s compensation unless the consumer, post dispute, voluntarily 
elects to pay a portion of the arbitrator’s compensation.” AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
CONSUMER-RELATED DISPUTES: SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES 12 (2013), 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Consumer-Related%20Disputes%20Supplementary
%20Procedures%20Sep%2015%2C%202005.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JGE-WA6C]. 
 237. The AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules provide that the “filing fee must be paid 
before a matter is considered properly filed. If the court order directs that a specific party 
is responsible for the filing fee, it is the responsibility of the filing party either to make 
such payment to the AAA and seek reimbursement as directed in the court order or to 
make other such arrangements so that the filing fee is submitted to the AAA with the 
Demand.” AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND 
MEDIATION PROCEDURES 34 (2016) [hereinafter AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules], 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial%20Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QQK-
RWU2]. Moreover, the Consumer Arbitration Rules discuss “nonrefundable” filing fees. 
AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules, supra note 171, at 33–34. Whether one side of the 
dispute reimburses the other depends on the documents governing the specific arbitration, 
as referenced in the Consumer Rules, which state that in “cases before a single arbitrator, 
a nonrefundable filing fee capped in the amount of $200 is payable in full by the consumer 
when a case is filed, unless the parties’ agreement provides that the consumer pay less.” Id. 
at 34. 
 238. AAA Consumer Due Process, supra note 171, at 2. 
 239. See, e.g., Jerome B. Simandle, Enhancing Access to ADR for Unrepresented 
Litigants: Federal Court Programs Provide Models for Helping Pro Se Parties––and the 
Justice System, 22 DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2016, at 6, 8–10. 
 240. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1284.3(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017 
Reg. Sess.). 
 241. 31 U.S. 79 (2000). 
 242. Id. at 91–92. 
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the Court (again 5-4) reiterated that approach in American Express v. 
Italian Colors,243 involving a family-owned restaurant alleging that 
American Express had violated federal antitrust laws. The Court 
ruled that even though the expenses that Italian Colors would have to 
incur to pursue its claim were likely to be more than the sums it 
sought to recoup, that economic disparity did not constitute a basis 
for the federal courts to decline to enforce a ban on class actions.244 
These two U.S. Supreme Court decisions on accessibility 
involved efforts by individuals to enforce their federal statutory 
rights. In the 2011 AT&T case, a consumer sought recoupment of 
about thirty dollars based on a claim of deceptive advertising under 
California law; the filing fee to pursue arbitration was many times 
that amount. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that the FAA 
preempted California’s protection of consumers that would have 
permitted less well-resourced claimants to bring collective actions.245 
State law may, nonetheless, have some means of insisting on 
affordability in individual cases, either by applying the Green Tree 
test or through finding fee obligations to be unconscionable. 
California, for example, requires that if employees allege violations of 
state statutory rights and if employers require arbitration, an 
employer is required to pay all costs “unique to arbitration.”246 In 
addition, California requires that consumer arbitration providers 
waive their administrative charges for “indigent consumers,” defined 
as those with incomes of “less than 300 percent of the federal poverty 
guidelines.”247 This provision does not apply to arbitrators’ own fees, 
but to costs imposed by the entities that administer arbitration. 
California instructs providers to give consumers notice of this option 
 
 243. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 244. Id. at 2310–11; see Brian Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 
161, 172–73 (2015). 
 245. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351–52 (2011). 
 246. See Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689 (Cal. 
2000); Hovanesyan v. Glendale Internal Med. & Cardiology Med. Grp., No. B277855, 2017 
WL 2391688, at *7–9 (Cal. Ct App. June 2, 2017). The court in Hovanesyan analyzed a 
rule by JAMS that put the right to recovery “at risk” if a plaintiff did not pay its share of 
arbitration costs. 2017 WL 2391688, at *8–9; see also Penilla v. Westmont Corp., 207 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 473, 487 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). Ambitions to do more to support individuals come 
from model state consumer and employee laws, proposed by consumer advocates. See 
MODEL STATE CONSUMER & EMP. JUSTICE ENF’T ACT tit. IV § 2(e) (DAVID 
SELIGMAN, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. 2015). 
 247. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1284.3(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.); 
see also Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., 353 P.3d 741, 755 (Cal. 2015) (“In 
enacting Code of Civil Procedure section 1284.3, the Legislature concluded that an 
ability-to-pay approach is appropriate in the context of consumer arbitration 
agreements.”). 
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and to create forms for sworn declarations that a particular consumer 
qualifies; providers are not to ask for additional information.248 
In compliance, the AAA provides a “Waiver of Fees Notice for 
Use by California Consumers Only” on its website.249 Another 
document (not available on the web) applies to the rest of the country 
and has the title “Affidavit in Support of Reduction or Deferral of 
Filing and Administrative Fees.”250 The latter form requires 
consumers outside of California to make detailed disclosures of 
assets, income, and liabilities and does not indicate the availability of 
full fee waivers.251 AAA staff report that waivers have been provided 
when requests are made, but that the AAA does not track the 
numbers or kinds of waivers, deductions, or deferrals given.252 Thus, 
robust and publicly accessible analogues to court-based in forma 
pauperis proceedings are not available in arbitration. 
Turning then to courts, the obligation to waive fees generally 
stems from statutes, pegged to poverty.253 As I discussed in Part II, in 
the early 1970s, constitutional law came into play. The U.S. Supreme 
Court mandated fee waivers for the class of plaintiffs seeking divorces 
in Connecticut, which lacked a statute providing for such an 
exemption.254 As I also noted, the U.S. tests for eligibility are narrow, 
while courts in Canada and the U.K have required fee waivers 
 
 248. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1284.3(b)(3) (Westlaw). 
 249. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, AFFIDAVIT FOR WAIVER OF FEES NOTICE FOR USE 
BY CALIFORNIA CONSUMERS ONLY, https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/AAA
%20Affidavit%20for%20Waiver%20of%20Fees%20Notice%20California%20Consumers.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7WQU-SKWE]. 
 250. Affidavit in Support of Reduction or Deferral of Filing and Administrative Fees, 
Am. Arbitration Ass’n (on file with author). 
 251. Id. 
 252. The information came from an exchange of emails and telephone interviews with 
Ryan Boyle, AAA’s Vice President for Statistics and In-House Research. See Sept. 2017 
Email from Ryan Boyle, supra note 206; Email from Ryan Boyle, Vice President, Statistics 
& In-House Research, Am. Arbitration Ass’n, to Judith Resnik (Oct. 25, 2017) (on file 
with author); Telephone Interviews with Ryan Boyle, Vice President, Statistics & In-
House Research, Am. Arbitration Ass’n (Feb. 2015, Apr. 2015, Aug. 2017, Sept. 2017, Jan. 
25, 2018). 
 253. See, e.g., C.S. v. W.O., 178 Cal. Rptr. 3d 338, 343–44 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). A trial 
court had held that because a recipient of public benefits had received a $1,000 gift to pay 
for an expedited transcript on an appeal in a child custody dispute, she was not eligible to 
have a fee waiver. Id. at 340. The appellate court reversed, citing both the constitutional 
mandates of due process and equal protection and the California statute providing fee 
waivers if persons received public benefits, and that, once granted, the waivers continued 
in all stages of the proceedings. Id. at 342–44. 
 254. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380–82 (1970); supra text accompanying 
notes 48–52. 
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through showings of economic hardship expressly limited to 
indigency.255 
No national database of which I am aware tracks the numbers of 
individuals who seek to file without prepayment of court fees or who 
ask for waivers at subsequent proceedings. One recent study, about 
how low-income litigants “plead poverty” in the federal courts, found 
that the test for waiving filing fees varies by jurisdiction and, within 
the federal system, by district court and sometimes by district judge.256 
A possible proxy for information on fee waivers comes from 
research on litigants who are self-represented and sometimes labeled 
“pro se.” My opening discussion noted that about a quarter of the 
civil filings in the federal courts are brought by individuals lacking 
lawyers,257 that rates of appeals without lawyers run in excess of fifty 
percent,258 and that research on state courts identified a set of about 
650,000 civil cases in which at least one side in three-quarters of the 
cases had no lawyer.259 Most often, that party was the defendant.260 
In addition to filing fees, courts impose many other charges. 
Illinois’s 2016 Task Force identified “a tremendous growth in the 
assessments imposed on the parties to court proceedings.” Both civil 
plaintiffs and defendants are “required to pay hundreds of dollars” to 
pursue or to defend claims.261 In that state, the fees vary by county,262 
which can include local add-ons to support facilities, such as children’s 
waiting rooms and libraries.263 An overview comes from Figure 2, 
 
 255. See R (on application of UNISON) v. Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51, [117] 
(Lord Reed) (appeal taken from Eng.); see also supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text. 
 256. See Andrew Hammond, Pleading Poverty in Federal Court 3 (Feb. 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 257. See 2016 U.S. DISTRICT COURTS PRO SE FILINGS, supra note 5; 2005–2010 U.S. 
DISTRICT COURT PRO SE FILINGS, supra note 5. The federal district court database 
details unrepresented litigants (termed “pro se filings”) back to 2005. 
 258. See U.S. APPELLATE COURT PRO SE FILINGS, supra note 6. 
 259. LANDSCAPE CIVIL LITIGATION STATE COURTS 2015, supra note 7, at 31–32. 
 260. Id. at iv. In 1992, attorneys had represented both parties in ninety-five percent of 
the cases; in 2012 to 2013, in twenty-four percent of the cases. See id. at 31. 
 261. ILLINOIS COURT ASSESSMENTS 2016, supra note 19, at 1. 
 262. Id. at 10. 
 263. For example, the filing fee in one county was $267. See MCLEAN CTY. CIRCUIT 
CLERK, MCLEAN CTY. LAW & JUSTICE CTR., CIVIL FEE FILING SCHEDULE 3 (2017), 
http://www.mcleancountyil.gov/DocumentCenter/Home/View/2751 [https://perma.cc/N6HK-
HDUG]. This schedule lists what look like additional fees for arbitration; for example of 
claims seeking $10,000 to $15,000, it appears that an additional fee of $182 is imposed. Id. 
In McHenry County, arbitration filing fees range from $167 to $252. MCHENRY CTY. 
CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT, FEE SCHEDULE 1 (2017), https://www.co.mchenry.il.us
/home/showdocument?id=71476 [https://perma.cc/P6C8-CAKH]. Additionally, Illinois 
charges a party who declines the non-binding outcome of court-annexed arbitration a 
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Civil Court Assessments in Illinois, which is reproduced from the 
Task Force Report, and sets forth the ingredients of what it called a 
“recipe” of fees stemming from different sources. Notable is the 
imposition of the fee charged to civil defendants; unless qualifying for 
fee waivers, defendants have to pay between $15 and $110 to answer 


























“rejection fee” of $200 for awards less than $30,000, and $500for awards greater than 
$30,000, unless the party is indigent. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 93. 
 264. ILLINOIS COURT ASSESSMENTS 2016, supra note 19, at 10. 
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“Hundreds of dollars” in fees is apt not only for Illinois, but also 
for many other states. San Diego County charges $435 for child 
support filings if a child support agency does not intervene and $700 
for the adoption of a stepchild.265 Moreover, although some states 
provide that waivers must be accorded for all stages of proceedings, 
litigants may need to renew applications to obtain waivers.266 Like 
Illinois, California imposes charges on defendants to respond to 
claims. The amounts for both plaintiffs and defendants vary with the 
value of the claim and for some cases, such as those seeking 
protective orders, no fees are charged. In small claims court 
(involving $10,000 or less), filing fees for plaintiffs range from thirty 
to seventy-five dollars.267 Figure 3 provides a sampling of some of the 
fees charged as of 2017 in five major states, California, Florida, 
Illinois, New York, and Washington, which had in total almost 100 













 265. Family Law Fees, SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CTY. OF SAN DIEGO, 
http://www.sdcourt.ca.gov/portal/page?_pageid=55,1524419&_dad=portal&_schema=POR
TAL [https://perma.cc/5PNG-XFFQ]. In Los Angeles County, it costs $435 to file for child 
support if a child support agency does not intervene and $424 for the child interview 
portion of child custody evaluation. SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CTY. OF LOS ANGELES, 
CIVIL FEE SCHEDULE 4, (July 1, 2016), http://www.lacourt.org/forms/pdf/fees/fee-
schedule-2016_rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GBM-ACWH]. 
 266. An example comes from Kim v. De Maria, 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 849 (Cal. App. Dep’t 
Super. Ct. 2013). There, the court concluded that, given that a defendant received public 
benefits, he was “entitled to have all fees waived including jury fees and expenses.” Id. at 
852 (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68632). 
 267. See SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., STATEWIDE CIVIL FEE SCHEDULE 5–6 (2017), 
http://www.fresno.courts.ca.gov/fees_schedule/documents/Statewide%20Civil%20Fee%20
Schedule%20January%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/PB4L-NU3K]. The amount for filing 
the “first paper” in cases involving more than $25,000 is $435, and in claims involving 
$10,000-$25,000, the amount is $370. Id. at 1. 
 268. See U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 
https://www.census.gov/popclock/ [https://perma.cc/2ZZH-HYGU]. 
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My focus is on how cost barriers suppress information in civil 
litigation, but mention needs to be made of fees imposed on criminal 
defendants.269 Illustrative are “registration fees” for indigent 
defendants entitled to legal counsel. Los Angeles County charged 
fifty dollars to defendants being assigned a “free” lawyer and, in 2016, 
had garnered about $300,000 from those fees. In the summer of 2017, 
the county was persuaded to remove the fee.270 “Services”—such as 
 
 269. See generally ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS 
PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR (2016). See also MARIE CLAIRE TRAN-LEUNG, SHRIVER 
CTR., DEBT ARISING FROM ILLINOIS’ CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: MAKING SENSE OF 
THE AD HOC ACCUMULATION OF FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS 1 (2009), 
http://povertylaw.org/files/docs/debt-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/YPN9-P32C] (“When a 
person enters the criminal justice system, a complicated, ad hoc system of financial 
obligations awaits.”). 
 270. See DEVON PORTER, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF S. CAL., PAYING FOR 
JUSTICE: THE HUMAN COST OF PUBLIC DEFENDER FEES 2 (2017), https://www.aclusocal.org
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drug courts, probation, and ankle bracelet monitoring—are also the 
bases for yet more assessments, and failure to pay can result in threats 
of imprisonment. Fines impose yet other costs, illustrated by litigation 
against Virginia’s practice of automatically suspending driver’s 
licenses when tickets were not paid.271 
Many lawsuits (sometimes brought as class actions) challenge the 
cascading wave of fees, fines, assessments, and surcharges. The result 
is that courts have become venues for conflicts about their own costs. 
Both state and federal judges are returning to the questions raised in 
1971 in Boddie v. Connecticut about how commitments to “open 
courts,” due process, equal protection, and prohibitions on excessive 
fines affect fees charged by courts. For example, a 2013 ruling by the 
Supreme Court of Washington held that its constitution required that 
a “surcharge” added to deal with budget shortfalls had to be waived 
once a person was found to qualify for a filing fee waiver.272 
Challenges based on unconstitutional conflicts of interest have also 
been raised because some of the fees generated are returned to the 
entities imposing them.273 One federal district court concluded that 
due process obligations of impartiality were violated because the 
judges deciding on fee waivers benefitted from the fees recouped.274 
I have discussed the financial obligations produced by the court 
system, but the costs of courts have to be understood in broader 
terms, including the economic impact of the lack of access and of the 
time to reach decisions. The issue of disposition time was the focus of 
a recent study, prompted by the major cutbacks in the budget of the 
 
/sites/default/files/pdfees-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AG6-3MTA]; Nina Agrawal, L.A. 
County Ends Public Defender ‘Registration Fee’, L.A. TIMES (June 6, 2017), 
http://beta.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-registration-fee-20170606-story.html [https://perma.cc
/C2FG-DB5Y]. 
 271. See Stinnie v. Holcomb, No. 3:16-cv-00044, 2017 WL 963234, at *3–4 (W.D. Va. 
Mar. 13, 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-1740 (4th Cir.). Members of the plaintiff class in 
Stinnie had their driver’s licenses revoked after being “convicted of some traffic violation 
or crime, thus incurring court costs, fees, and fines they could not afford to pay.” Id. at *4. 
According to the district court, “hundreds of thousands of Virginians allegedly have had 
their licenses suspended for failure to pay court costs and fines.” Id. at *3. 
 272. Jafar v. Webb, 303 P.3d 1042, 1043 (Wash. 2013). 
 273. See, e.g., Cain v. City of New Orleans, No. 15-4479, 2017 WL 6372836, at *21–22 
(E.D. La. Dec. 13, 2017); Kevin McGill, 'Mayor's Court' Taken to Federal Court in 
Louisiana, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/louisiana
/articles/2017-12-06/mayors-court-taken-to-federal-court-in-louisiana. 
 274. Cain, 2017 WL 6372836, at *26. The court discussed Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 
(1927), in which money raised by fines levied “was divided between the state, the village 
general fund, and two other village funds.” Cain, 2017 WL 6372836, at *22. As in that 
famous Prohibition-era case, the district court in Cain concluded that the judges’ “direct 
pecuniary interest in the outcome” created financial motives to convict. Id. at *22, *25 
(quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 535). 
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California judiciary. Researchers sought to measure the direct and 
indirect losses in the wake of the decrease in funding275 and put the 
loss of some 150,000 jobs and $30 billion in what it termed “economic 
output.”276 Looking at time-to-disposition in federal courts and in 
arbitration, the report praised arbitration for producing faster 
dispositions.277 What the Report did not, however, explore is how the 
vastly larger number of civil cases—217,288—filed in federal district 
courts in 2015, as compared to 1,375 cases in the AAA caseload, 
affected the analysis. Nor did the report factor in the “missing cases” 
that could have been pursued individually or as collective actions in 
court. 
Figures 2 and 3 provide glimpses of the dollars assessed in courts. 
The published schedules of fees have become the bases for lawsuits 
and for court-authorized task forces seeking to make changes. Given 
the Supreme Court’s enforcement of privately-imposed class action 
bars, no pending cases of which I am aware contest the structure and 
the costs of arbitration processes. Closed processes not only limit 
access to claiming and suppress information on the cases filed, but 
also cut off debates on and challenges to the costs of the processes by 
which disputes are resolved. 
C. Losing Adjudication 
Remarkably few cases actually involve much litigation. The 
National Center on State Court’s research on state court dispositions 
evaluated almost a million cases dealt with between 2012 and 2013.278 
Most of the civil cases involved debt collection, in which most debtor-
defendants were not represented, and almost all of the decisions took 
place without adjudication (defined to include court-annexed 
arbitration) on the merits.279 Specifically, about two-thirds of the 
 
 275. ROY WEINSTEIN, CULLEN EDES, JOE HALE & NELS PEARSALL, MICRONOMICS, 
EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION THROUGH 
ARBITRATION COMPARED WITH U.S. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS 2 (2017), 
http://go.adr.org/rs/294-SFS-516/images/Economic%20Impact%20of%20Delay%20Micronomics
%20Final%20Report%20%282017-03-07%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZL77-2JYQ]. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 2–3. The numbers of cases for arbitration came from the AAA and involved 
7,416 cases. Id. at 32 n.47. Of the cases that went to award, 637 (8.6%) were consumer 
cases. Id.; see also supra Figure 1. 
 278. LANDSCAPE CIVIL LITIGATION STATE COURTS 2015, supra note 7, at iii. 
 279. Id. at iii, 20, 31. The data on other forms of dispositions are what social scientists 
call “noisy,” in that about a quarter have an “unspecified” judgment and the grounds for 
neither the thirty-five percent dismissed nor the ten percent settled were specified in court 
documents. Id. at 20. 
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filings involved contract claims; more than one half of that set of 
claims were landlord-tenant and debt collection. 
Those numbers reflect a change in the kinds of cases coming to 
court and in the modes of disposition. Twenty years ago, in a parallel 
study, the NCSC found that about half of the claims analyzed were 
tort cases;280 the NCSC’s 2012-2013 data put tort cases down to seven 
percent.281 In about three-quarters of the more recent judgments 
analyzed, the sums were under $5,200, and the study reported that 
overall, four percent of the filings were disposed of by trials. 282  
In federal court, the statistic that has become familiar is that one-
in-one-hundred civil cases starts a trial. The shorthand is the 
“vanishing trial.” Opportunities for the public to watch proceedings 
other than trial are also diminishing, as recorded in research on 
“bench presence,” counting the hours that federal judges spend in 
open court, whether on trial or not. The study reported a “steady 
year-over-year decline in total courtroom hours” from 2008 to 2012 
that continued into 2013.283 Judges spent less than two hours a day on 
average in the courtroom, or about “423 hours of open court 
proceedings per active district judge.”284 
What about decision-making in mandated arbitration? In Section 
IV.A, I provided a snapshot of claims resolved during eight years that 
involved one company and were administered by the AAA. But recall 
that, as of 2017, of more than thirty institutions running consumer 
 
 280. The 1992 data were drawn from case outcomes in the seventy-five “most populous 
counties” in the country. Id. at 7. Of about 762,000 tort, contract, and property 
dispositions, approximately 378,000 were tort cases. See CAROL J. DEFRANCES, JOHN A. 
GOERDT, PATRICK A. LANGAN & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992: TORT CASES 
IN LARGE COUNTIES 6 (1995), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/TCILC.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/D9T3-MUYA]; see also CAROL J. DEFRANCES, STEVEN K. SMITH, 
PATRICK A. LANGAN, BRIAN J. OSTROM, DAVID B. ROTTMAN & JOHN A. GOERDTY, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF 
STATE COURTS, 1992: CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 1 (1995), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cjcavilc.pdf [https://perma.cc/U336-2XGU]. 
 281. LANDSCAPE CIVIL LITIGATION STATE COURT 2015, supra note 7, at iv. 
 282. Id. Adjudication was defined for these purposes as trials by a judge or jury, 
summary judgment, and binding arbitration. In the 1992 survey, 62% of the cases were 
disposed of through settlements, and 3% were disposed of by judge or jury trial. Id. at 7. 
Thus, in the 2012-2013 data, of the almost one million cases, 32,124 trials took place, of 
which 1109 (3%) were jury trials, and 31,015 (97%) were bench trials. Id. at 25. Jury 
awards exceeded $500,000 in 17 (3%) of the cases, and 75% of the jury awards in tort 
cases were below $152,000. Id. at 28. The 2012-2013 study also noted that, as contrasted 
with 1992, both parties were represented in 24% of the bench trials. Id. at 28. 
 283. Jordan M. Singer & Hon. William G. Young, Bench Presence 2014: An Updated 
Look at Federal District Court Productivity, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 565, 565 (2014). 
 284. Id. at 566. 
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arbitrations in California, about one-third file the data as the state 
statute directs. Moreover, the statute calls for five years of data, and 
each time the AAA puts up a new three-month interval, it has 
developed a practice of taking down earlier intervals of data. 
Therefore, unless researchers independently stockpile data and until 
many other providers comply, no comprehensive account is available 
about the patterns of arbitration’s use over time. 
 
V.  THE “LOGICS” AND THE “EXPERIENCES” OF COURTS 
 AND OF ARBITRATION 
Judges’ experiences with growing numbers of poor people in 
court are part of what prompts states to convene A2J task forces to 
find new routes for the funding of litigants and courts.285 In some 
instances, state judiciaries have succeeded in obtaining new streams 
of funding to provide legal services for cases involving housing and 
families. New York, for example, under the leadership of former 
Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman, set aside $100 million for civil legal 
services in 2017.286 Illinois’s Task Force aims to alter its filing fee 
system.287 Connecticut’s Task Force has proposed a statutory right to 
civil counsel for domestic violence, child custody, and eviction cases, 
as well as fee-shifting in foreclosure and debt collection cases.288 If the 
political will is available, some of the problems can be mitigated. 
Indeed, given that courts’ budgets are typically a small percentage 
(two to three percent) of state and federal expenditures, public 
insistence on funding could do more. 
Other restructuring can come from regulations of ADR/ODR 
and arbitration as well as from the development of constitutional 
doctrine, which could be put to work to retrieve public access to 
dispute resolution. I have already noted constitutional challenges to 
 
 285. See CIVIL JUSTICE IMPROVEMENTS COMM., CALL TO ACTION: ACHIEVING 
CIVIL JUSTICE FOR ALL: RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES 
4–6 (2016), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/microsites/files/civil-justice/ncsc-cji-report-web.ashx 
[https://perma.cc/3JJL-S2D4]. 
 286. JONATHAN LIPPMAN, LAWRENCE K. MARKS, RONALD P. YOUNKINS, BARRY R. 
CLARKE & MAUREEN H. MCALARY, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., FISCAL YEAR 
2016-2017 BUDGET (2017), https://www.nycourts.gov/admin/financialops/BGT16-17/2016-
17-UCS-Budget.pdf [https://perma.cc/X38Y-D43M]. 
 287. See ILLINOIS COURT ASSESSMENTS 2016, supra note 19, at 38–39, app. A 
(Proposed Court Clerk Assessment Act, 705 ILCS 105/27.1); see also 705 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 105/27.1a (West, Westlaw through Pub. Acts effective Jan. 1, 2018). 
 288. WILLIAM H. CLENDENEN, JR. & TIMOTHY FISHER, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, 
JUDICIARY COMM., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO LEGAL 
COUNSEL IN CIVIL MATTERS (2016), http://www.rc.com/upload/O-Hanlan-Final-Report-
of-CT-Leg-Task-Force-12_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YS9-ZMBF]. 
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fines, fees, surcharges, bail, and the structure of financial obligations 
stemming from courts. Here, I focus both on regulations and on the 
mandates for public access to court proceedings, which are predicated 
on a mix of common, statutory, and constitutional law. 
One method for interrupting privatization can be regulatory, as 
illustrated by British Columbia289 and, in the United States, by the 
CFPB’s efforts in 2016 and 2017. In addition to proposing that pre-
dispute class action waivers not go into effect in the financial products 
and services markets over which it had jurisdiction, the CFPB also 
sought to require reporting on arbitration—through databasing on a 
website, with redactions if needed for individuals’ privacy.290 That 
rule, which shared some of the features of California and other states’ 
mandates on reporting, required information on the initial claim 
requested, the documents mandating arbitration, and 
communications between individual arbitrators and the administrator 
(such as the AAA) related to problems if the service provider had not 
paid required fees.291 But such efforts were stymied in October of 
2017 when Congress (with the Vice President voting in the Senate) 
passed a resolution providing that the CFPB’s proposed “rule shall 
have no force or effect.”292 
Other U.S. regulatory systems do impose obligations for 
arbitration providers to make some information public. The Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) requires public disclosure 
of awards,293 as does the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (“ICANN”), a non-profit that created a dispute 
resolution system for disagreements about domain names; ICANN 
 
 289. See supra notes 132-138. 
 290. See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,830, 32,838, 32,868 (proposed May 
24, 2016) (to have been codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040). 
 291. See id. The proposal is analyzed in Nancy A. Welsh, Dispute Resolution Neutrals’ 
Ethical Obligation to Support Reasonable Transparency (Nov. 14, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). As she details, the proposal garnered “strong support” 
from the American Bar Association’s Section of Dispute Resolution. Id. at 7–9; see also 
Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Dispute Resolutions, Comment Letter on the Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection Proposed Rule on Arbitration Agreements (July 29, 2016) 
[hereinafter ABA Dispute Resolution Section 2016 Comments], 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/dispute_resolution/bars/dr-cfpb
-comments_7-29-16.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD79-V5FT]. 
 292. See Joint Resolution Providing for Congressional Disapproval under Chapter 8 of 
Title 5, United States Code, of the Rule Submitted by Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection Relating to “Arbitration Agreements,” Pub. L. No. 115-74, 131 Stat. 1243 (Nov. 
1, 2017). 
 293. See Welsh, supra note 291, at 13; Rule 12904(h): Awards, FINRA, 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4192 [https://perma.cc
/LUG5-DMF8]. 
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publishes arbitrators’ decisions.294 Moreover, as the analysis of the 
AAA filings reflects, state statutes can also force information about 
arbitration into the open. 
Another question is what work constitutional mandates could 
play in making public the processes of and the decisions in dispute 
resolution. As I sketch below, the current case law offers doctrinal 
access; interpretations of the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments, coupled with Article III’s creation of an independent 
judiciary, make impermissible the closing off of trials and related 
court proceedings. What the doctrine does not (yet) do is to take into 
account changing procedures in and out of court and insist on 
functional openness. Hence, a few details about the limits and 
possibilities of the current law are in order. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that criminal trials and related 
activities, including voir dire and pre-trial suppression hearings, are to 
be open, absent case-specific reasons that permit narrowly tailored 
closings of a particular proceeding.295 The Court’s strong stance bent 
some in 2017 when it declined to find that a routine practice in 
Massachusetts of closing courtrooms during voir dire constituted a 
structural error requiring enforcement by vacating a conviction.296 
The Court has not directly addressed the public’s right to observe 
civil litigation, but lower courts have read the precedents, coupled 
with common law, to require access to civil litigation analogous to 
that accorded in criminal litigation. The Court’s approach, predicated 
 
 294. See Rule 16(b) of Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 
ICANN, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/udrp-rules-2015-03-11-en [https://perma.cc
/D27B-FDK7]; Welsh, supra note 291, at 14. 
 295. See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 209 (2010); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 
40, 45 (1984); see also Simonson, supra note 101, at 2195–96 (analyzing the uneven 
application of these rulings in the lower courts). 
 296. See Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1910 (2017) (“[W]hile the public-
trial right is important for fundamental reasons, in some cases an unlawful closure might 
take place and yet the trial still will be fundamentally fair from the defendant’s 
standpoint.”). Thus, the standard of review varied depending on whether the claim was 
raised “on direct review or raised instead in a claim alleging ineffective assistance of 
counsel.” Id. at 1912. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted that Weaver’s 
attorney did not object to court room closure because he “did not understand that the 
public had a right to be present during the jury empanelment phase of the trial 
proceedings.” Commonwealth v. Weaver, 54 N.E.3d 495, 520 (Mass. 2016). As Justice 
Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan, explained in his Weaver dissent, the Court had 
recognized that “the benefits of a public trial are frequently intangible, difficult to prove, 
or a matter of chance.” Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1917 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Waller, 
467 U.S. at 49). As a result, “a requirement that prejudice be shown ‘would in most cases 
deprive [the defendant] of the [public-trial] guarantee, for it would be difficult to envisage 
a case in which he would have evidence available of specific injury.’” Id. (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 n.9) (alteration in original)). 
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on the First Amendment, relies on historical experiences of courts as 
public venues and the values of the resulting public exchanges. The 
normative argument reflects (albeit not always with citations) 
Bentham’s concerns about education, oversight, and accountability.297 
Judges describe the analysis as considering the “experience” of 
practices over time to ascertain whether a “tradition of accessibility” 
has existed for a kind of proceeding. Judges then assess the “logic,” 
which entails the claimed benefits of openness or closure through 
evaluating whether “access plays a significant positive role in the 
functioning of the particular process in question.”298 The doctrine 
does not provide clear direction about the vantage point (litigants, 
courts, the public, or social welfare more generally) from which to 
make that assessment. Should the perspective be that of litigants or 
judges eager for closure, or of third parties such as those participating 
in #MeToo and complaining about how insistence on secrecy stymied 
their claims? 
Despite the fuzziness, courts using this test have found 
constitutional access rights to civil trials and to related court-based 
proceedings. As in criminal cases, openness can be tempered under 
U.S. law, as it was for Bentham.299 If a proceeding does qualify as 
 
 297. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 507–08 (1986); Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571–72 (1980) (plurality opinion); see also BENTHAM, 
RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, supra note 31. 
 298. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1986). This test was developed from 
Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers, joined by Justice 
Marshall, Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 584–89, and has been applied in civil cases, 
see, for example, Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 514 (3d Cir. 2013); 
N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 297–99 (2d Cir. 2012); and 
Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1061 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 299. Bentham’s enthusiasm for openness did not render him insensitive to the burdens 
of public processes and the need for privacy. His justifications for privacy included 
protecting participants from “annoyance,” avoiding unnecessary harm to individuals 
through “disclosure of facts prejudicial to their honour” or about their “pecuniary 
circumstances,” and preserving both “public decency” and state secrets. BENTHAM, 
RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, supra note 31, at 360. Specifically, exceptions 
permitted expelling those who disturbed a proceeding and closing proceedings for the 
preservation of “peace and good order,” to “protect the judge, the parties, and all other 
persons present, against annoyance,” to “preserve the tranquility and reputation of 
individuals and families from unnecessary vexation by disclosure of facts prejudicial to 
their honour, or liable to be productive of uneasiness or disagreements among 
themselves,” to avoid “unnecessary disclosure of . . . pecuniary circumstances,” “to 
preserve public decency from violation” and to protect “secrets of state.” Id. Bentham’s 
list of circumstances for closure, like his arguments for openness, parallel those made in 
contemporary courts. For example, the European Convention on Human Rights provides 
that: 
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open, the next decision is whether special considerations justify a 
narrowly tailored closure. 
A related line of cases focuses specifically on public access to 
documents filed in court.300 The case law, mixing common law 
traditions and constitutional values, requires access to “judicial 
documents” that are “relevant to the performance of the judicial 
function and useful in the judicial process.”301 Judges describe a 
“strong presumption in favor of openness” if records are filed in 
court,302 with the burden of closure falling to the party seeking to do 
so,303 again coupled with admonitions to tailor narrowly any sealing.304 
If this body of law can help to make non-trial-based ADR and 
ODR open to third parties, more analyses are needed about what 
constitutes “judicial documents” and whether the concept of “judicial 
documents” applies when “judges” are ADR providers, such as court-
annexed arbitrations. Aspects of these questions have been explored. 
For example, judges have debated whether materials attached to 
motions or reports from post-settlement monitors or by government 
agencies fall within the mandated accessibility.305 In litigation related 
to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the question was whether 
a settlement involving property claims against airline insurers would 
be made publicly available.306 The New York Times succeeded in 
 
Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded 
from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national 
security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection 
of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the 
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the 
interests of justice. 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
art. 6, § 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. Examples of debates about closure in the 
context of national security can be found in Botmeh v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
15187/03, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. 659, 662–67 (2008). 
 300. See, e.g., Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 93–96 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 301. See United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145–46 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 302. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983); 
see also Hartford Courant Co., 380 F.3d at 92, 96. 
 303. In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 194 (3d Cir. 2001). The burden is a heavy one: 
“Only the most compelling reasons can justify non-disclosure of judicial records.” In re 
Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 304. See Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2002); see also 
Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 305–06 (6th Cir. 2016); 
JetAway Aviation, LLC v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 754 F.3d 824, 826–27 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 305. See, e.g., United States v. Erie Cty., 763 F.3d 235, 239–41 (2d Cir. 2014); SEC v. 
Am. Int’l Grp., 712 F.3d 1, 3–5 (D.C. Cir. 2013); IDT Corp. v. eBay, 709 F.3d 1220, 1223–
25 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 306. See In re Sept. 11 Lit., 723 F. Supp. 2d 526, 529–30 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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having a court grant its request to unseal the aggregate amounts of 
the settlement and the allocation of funds from contributing insurers 
but not information on amounts paid to settling defendants.307 
Another case involved reports by a court-appointed monitor in a case 
relating to conditions at a county jail; the Second Circuit held those 
materials had to be publicly accessible.308 And in 2017, the D.C. 
Circuit rejected the redaction of materials that had been sealed below 
but which were relevant to a pending appeal.309 
What the cases do not yet address are other activities that have 
become part of the “judicial function,” including managing and 
settling cases. Could regulations require or lawsuits force access to 
materials related to settlement efforts or require that the interactions 
among disputants and judges be held in open court and on the 
record? Return to the two doctrinal prongs of “experience” and 
“logic.” As noted, a few jurists report doing their Rule 16 conferences 
on the bench, yet no rules oblige doing so. As for the “logic,” the 
issue would be whether openness plays a “significant positive role.” If 
court-annexed arbitration, for example, is open, then experiences of it 
can be used to confirm the vitality of public access. But if 
confidentiality becomes the norm, one could rely on that experience 
as the basis for overruling challenges to closed procedures.310 The 
Court’s test thus invites troubling circularity, as practices in place turn 
what “is” into what ought to be. 
Another issue is who counts as a “judge.” Court-based 
arbitrators are, under federal statutes, accorded judge-like immunity 
 
 307. Id. at 533. 
 308. Erie Cty., 763 F.3d at 241. 
 309. Metlife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 865 F.3d 661, 667–69 (D.C. Cir. 
2017). The company had challenged the decision by the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council that had designated it under the Dodd–Frank Act to be a “nonbank financial 
company,” which subjected it to more supervision by Federal Reserve System’s Board of 
Governors. Id. at 663. A group called “Better Markets” sought to intervene to unseal the 
briefs and appendices related to summary judgment. Id. at 664. The trial court permitted 
intervention but rejected the motion to unseal; the appellate court held that the materials 
were “judicial records” and that the Dodd–Frank Act did not limit the common law right 
of public access. Id. at 664–69. The circuit court distinguished its decision in SEC v. 
American International Group, which had concluded that “an independent consultant’s 
reports were not judicial records.” Id. at 667–68. The circuit court in that case held that, 
although prepared because of a consent decree, the materials were not therefore given to 
the district court. Am. Int’l Grp., 712 F.3d at 3–5. In Metlife, in contrast, the court 
concluded that the relevant materials were before the district court and that redaction was 
not proper, even if some of the materials had been sealed below. 865 F.3d at 675–76. 
 310. Illustrative of that approach is the dissent in Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. 
Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 523–26 (3d Cir. 2013) (Roth, J., dissenting). 
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and constrained by judicial rules of disqualification.311 Yet while 
shielded from liability, they are not currently obliged to do their work 
in public or to report their decisions to the public. Were the work of 
court-based arbitrators to come within the “judicial function/judicial 
process” rubric, then materials provided in ADR could be made 
available and routinely data based, with caveats akin to the rules in 
British Columbia, would be to impose limits, such as to protect 
disclosures until after the decisions become final or new trials are 
held, or for personal privacy and other specified reasons for limiting 
access. 
A more ambitious doctrinal innovation would be to understand 
that, given that mandates to participate in arbitration come from non-
negotiable obligations that courts have enforced through the FAA,312 
the resulting “private” arbitrations are artifacts of public law, subject 
to regulation. Instead of arguing that mandated arbitration constitutes 
an unconstitutional delegation of federal judges’ Article III powers,313 
one could condition constitutionality on having the attributes of 
adjudication—openness, due process norms of impartiality and 
evenhandedness, and equal protection—travel with the delegation. 
Support for this equation of arbitration and adjudication comes 
from a debate in Nebraska about the constitutionality of arbitration 
itself. In 1889 and again in 1991, the Nebraska Supreme Court read 
the state constitution as prohibiting mandated arbitration because the 
closed processes were inconsistent with its “open courts”/”rights-to-
remedies” clauses.314 In response to the 1991 decision, lobbyists for 
arbitration succeeded in getting an amendment to the state’s 
constitution to license closed arbitrations as an exception to the open-
courts clause.315 But another argument remains—that because 
arbitration has become a licit substitute for court, it ought to be 
required, inter alia, to offer third parties opportunities to watch how it 
works. 
To summarize, if courts are to be sustained as open venues and if 
court-like activities are to become open, more than the current 
formulations are needed.316 Doing so will require weaning the 
 
 311. 28 U.S.C. § 655(b)–(c) (2012). 
 312. See Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 1, at 2860–63, 2870–74. 
 313. See PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 15–53 (2013). 
 314. See State v. Neb. Ass’n of Pub. Emps., 477 N.W.2d 577, 581–82 (Neb. 1991); 
German-Am. Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 41 N.W. 406, 406 (Neb. 1889). 
 315. Details of the political campaign for the amendment are provided in Resnik, 
Constitutional Entitlements, supra note 65, at 983–85. 
 316. See Resnik, Public Dimension, supra note 77, at 408–20, 423–27. 
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doctrine from its focus on “experiences,” which are increasingly of 
private activities, and insisting on expanded analyses of the “logic” 
supporting public processes. Moreover, the doctrine could rest on a 
mix of due process, equal protection, Article III, and First 
Amendment values to require both public access to, and collective 
actions in, courts and arbitration. 
The doctrinal presumption of open courts would apply to the 
surrogates for courts, as would the mandate to tailor narrow limits on 
third-party access. Parties and the decision-makers would have the 
burden of justifying why to shut the doors in particular cases, such as 
by relying on arguments familiar in courts and predicated on 
commercial interests in trade secrets or on personal safety and 
privacy. The result would be that, in contrast to current secrecy 
practices, most consumer and many employment arbitrations would 
have to be open. The enforceability of both the obligation to arbitrate 
and of the results could be conditioned on the provision of public 
access rights. 
VI.  THE INTERESTS AT STAKE 
Doctrine is not free-floating. Law is nested in political and social 
movements. The pressures to close off courts reflect efforts by 
contemporary political leaders, promising to diminish the provision of 
government services more generally. The conflicts over secrecy and 
openness in courts is part of a larger backlash against what I have 
elsewhere termed “statization”—the expansion during the twentieth 
century of government activities that aimed, in some measure, to be 
redistributive and egalitarian.317 My efforts here, to reconstitute 
predicates for open courts, goes against these deregulatory 
privatization efforts. 
To succeed entails a politics supportive of openness. Norms of 
egalitarian redistribution can be one route. In the current climate so 
accepting of inequalities, another entails clarifying that the problems 
posed by closed courts and diffuse dispute resolution are not 
identified as detrimental to low-income litigants alone. How can 
 
 317. See Judith Resnik, Globalization(s), Privatization(s), Constitutionalization, and 
Statization: Icons and Experiences of Sovereignty in the 21st Century, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
162, 168–73 (2013); Judith Resnik, Courts and Economic and Social Rights/Courts as 
Economic and Social Rights, in THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, 
(Katharine G. Young ed., forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 2–4) https://papers.ssrn.com
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McCluskey, Constitutional Economic Justice: Structural Power for “We the People,” 35 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 283–92 (2016). 
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repeat players be persuaded to see their interests furthered by 
openness? Evidence that some repeat players see the value of 
openness and its relationship to legitimacy comes from inside the 
market of dispute resolution providers. Examples include recent 
changes in investor-state dispute resolution under the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), which 
created “Transparency Rules” in 2013 for a subset of arbitrations and 
that requires (when the rules apply) disclosure of a wide range of 
information submitted to and issued by tribunals.318 
In the United States, a parallel call came both from the CFPB 
and, in the summer of 2016 from the ABA’s Dispute Resolution 
Section, which applauded the CFPB rule that would have mandated 
more disclosure in financial services arbitrations. That Section, 
comprised of lawyers committed to ADR, argued that transparency 
was particularly important to help “protect the integrity of arbitration 
and, by extension, the integrity of the strong federal policy in favor of 
arbitration” upon which the U.S. Supreme Court has insisted.319 The 
rule almost went into effect; Congress split in 2017, with half of the 
Senate supporting the CFPB regulations mandating openness in 
arbitration as well as limits on class action bans. Yet another example 
is the 2017 pending legislation to exempt sexual harassment claims 
from arbitration; that proposal reflects the impact of the #MeToo 
movement, whose participants, pressing for public disclosures, span 
the economic and political spectrum. 
This set of recent shifts builds on a long tradition of pro-court 
efforts by repeat players. Indeed, collective, court-based action has 
been deployed in service of a diverse set of claimants. For a period of 
time during the second half of the twentieth century, public and 
private sector actors understood their interests to be enhanced by 
opening up courts, including through class actions and multi-district 
litigation, facilitating the pursuit and the closure of claims.320 
The pioneering constitutional authorization to do so came at the 
behest of banks, seeking to obtain declarations that they had properly 
 
 318. See G.A. Res. 68/109, at 1–2 (Dec. 16, 2013); Lise Johnson, The Mauritius 
Convention on Transparency: Comments on the Treaty and its Role in Increasing 
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 319. See ABA Dispute Resolution Section 2016 Comments, supra note 291, at 8; 
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discharged their fiduciary obligations to beneficiaries of pooled 
trusts.321 In 1950, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Company,322 the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled N.Y. law could constitutionally authorize such 
collective accountings and reach beneficiaries nationwide.323 Doing so 
required new approaches to the Due Process Clause, governing the 
authority of courts to impose binding resolutions. While class actions 
have since come to be identified with civil rights, consumers, and 
employee plaintiffs, interest in collectivity was then sought to enable 
what the U.S. Supreme Court called the “vital state interest” of 
marketing pooled trusts that would not subject banks to extensive 
challenges for alleged imprudent management.324 The Court’s 1950 
caveat was that beneficiaries—across the country—had to be told of 
the pendency of the accounting. 
That process became the model for the 1966 revisions to the 
federal class action rule. And even then, some commentators worried 
that enabling collectivity would benefit corporate interests more than 
individuals.325 Yet, as it has turned out, class actions became icons of 
empowering groups when individuals did not have the “strength” to 
pursue their claims alone.326 Mandating notice forced knowledge 
about aggregate claims into the public sphere and produced the 
debates ongoing today about their fairness and utilities. Although 
individuals rarely respond to required notices, notice requirements 
put the fact of claiming into the mailboxes of millions and onto the 
public screen. 
The development of the constitutional law of fee waivers is 
likewise predicated on the government’s own need to legitimate court 
action. Just as that concern was a part of the calculus for the Court in 
Mullane, so too are “vital state interests” reflected in cases requiring 
that, as a matter of due process, governments subsidize lawyers for 
criminal defendants and help certain kinds of civil litigants327 to 
provide some semblance of what the English call “equality of arms” 
among disputants. The current wave of constitutional cases, 
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challenging the practice of using courts to generate revenues in ways 
that discriminate along race and class lines, again brings the question 
of the legitimacy of courts to the fore. 
All of us—rich and poor, plaintiff or defendant—need court 
systems. Given resource limits and the nature of contemporary harms, 
collective actions in courts and finding ways to make the various 
forms of ADR public are important facets of legitimacy. To bring 
openness back to courts as well as into their alternatives requires a 
broad political base. Repeat players (including the federal 
government) will need to understand that reviving public courts is in 
service of their interests in having thriving economies in which 
obligations can be fairly enforced.328 Politics made the law that 
opened up courts, and politics will either undo or recommit to dispute 
resolution in public. 
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